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INTRODUCTION

Lender liability litigation is increasing dramatically throughout the
country. Well-publicized verdicts against lenders are spawning myriad

new claims, transforming routine collection cases into potential sevenfigure liabilities.' In Florida, lender liability claims rely largely upon
traditional theories. 2 Attempts to engraft upon Florida law emerging

*Partner, Greenberg, Traurig, Hoffman, Lipoff, Rosen & Quentel, Miami, Florida. B.S.,
1975; J.D., 1978, University of Florida.
1. Among the leading lender liability cases are K.M.C. Co. v. Irving Trust Co., 757 F.2d
752 (6th Cir. 1984); A. Gay Jensen Farms Co. v. Cargill, Inc., 309 N.W.2d 285 (Minn. 1981)
(verdict for $3.6 million affirmed against lender); State Natl Bank v. Farah Mfg. Co., 678
S.W.2d 661 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984) (petition for writ of error dismissed and $18.6 million verdict
affirmed against lender). See generally Ebke & Griffin, Lender Liability to Debtors: Toward a
ConceptualFramework, 40 Sw. L.J. 775 (1986) (analyzing distribution of lending risks between
lenders and debtors in light of emerging theories of lender liability).
2. See Plantation Key Developers, Inc. v. Colonial Mortgage Co., 589 F.2d 164 (5th Cir.
1979) (breach of contract); American Natl Bank v. Norris, 368 So. 2d 897 (1st D.C.A.), cert.
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doctrines that prevail elsewhere yield mixed results, partly because
of the state's divergent judicial philosophies.
On the one hand, Florida courts have repeatedly underscored their3
responsibility to enforce contracts as they were written by the parties.
Establishing a theme generally favorable to the lender, the Supreme
Court of Florida has said the obligation of courts to safeguard and
enforce written contracts has constitutional dimensions. 4 Matched
against this conservative perspective are expanding tort remedies
against lenders. As a result, the lender relying on loan documents can
face an assortment of claims blending traditional grievances with creative twists fueled by evolving out-of-state law.
Although written provisions ordinarily favor lenders, borrowers may
claim breach of a lending contract, sometimes based on oral agreements, and contend the lender has waived written preconditions that
would otherwise vindicate its position. 5 Also significant are common
law fraud claims which, by circumnavigating the parol evidence rule,
can supplant even comprehensive written documentation with alleged
oral misrepresentation. 6 Another important borrower's claim is inten-

denied, 378 So. 2d 342 (Fla. 1979) (breach of contract); Financial Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v.
Continental Enter., Inc., 338 So. 2d 907 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1976). See also Norin Mortgage Corp.
v. Wasco, Inc., 343 So. 2d 940 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1977) (breach of contract claim against lender
by unpaid subcontractor on project).
3. E.g., Br~ant v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 130 So. 2d 132 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1961).
Thus, in Bryant, the court said, "[c]ourts cannot make contracts for the parties, and where
agreements are unambiguous, they must be enforced in accordance with their terms." Id. at 134.
4. David v. Sun Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 461 So. 2d 93 (Fla. 1984). In so ruling, the court
expressed concern about the "uncertainty injected in contractual relations" when contracts are
not adhered to and said courts "must apply rules which confer some degree of predictability on
the decision-making process." Id. at 95.
In applying written contracts, Florida courts presume that a party signing an agreement
has read, understood, and agreed to its stipulations, even if the signer claims to be illiterate.
See All Fla. Sur. Co. v. Coker, 88 So. 2d 508, 511 (Fla. 1956); Sutton v. Crane, 101 So. 2d
823, 825 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1958).
5. See United States Life Ins. Co. v. Town & Country Hosp., Inc., 390 So. 2d 71 (Fla. 2d
D.C.A. 1980) (defaulter introduced evidence of lender's waiver of deadline to perform loan
requirements); American Nat'l Bank v. Norris, 368 So. 2d 897 (1st D.C.A.) (evidence sufficient
to infer waiver by mortgagee of time for performing requirements), cert. denied, 378 So. 2d
342 (Fla. 1979).
6. See Roper v. Florida Pub. Util. Co., 131 Fla. 709, 714, 179 So. 904, 906 (1938) (there
is a difference between varying written terms of agreement through parol evidence and using
parol evidence to prove fraud); Tinker v. De Maria Porsche Audi, Inc., 459 So. 2d 487, 491
(Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1984) (parol evidence rule not applicable when fraud induces a written contract);
Pena v. Tampa Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 363 So. 2d 815, 817 (2d D.C.A. 1978) (oral evidence
may be introduced to prove procurement of written contract by fraud), cert. denied, 373 So.
2d 461 (Fla. 1979).
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tional inference, which may transform a lender's disruption of advantageous business or contractual relations into an adverse jury award. 7
A borrower may also use duress as a defense or remedy in a contractual
context.8
Sources of lender liability which often entail redefinition of the
lender's role and responsibilities are also emerging. 9 In some cases,

Florida courts are grappling with the scope of duty lenders owe to
others that can arise even from loan provisions inserted for lenders'
benefit. 10 Thus, a lender's careless practices in disbursing and managing loans may give rise to liability to others who suffer losses that
more diligent lending practices would have prevented.,
In addition to duties of ordinary care, borrowers also seek to apply
to lenders the more demanding standards that govern fiduciaries. If
the lender owes a borrower fiduciary duties, potential liability includes
far more exacting duties of care and disclosure. Integrally related to
the expansion of fiduciary responsibility are claims that a lender has
participated in a joint venture with the borrower or even, in extreme
cases, exercised so much control as to make the borrower its alter
ego. 13 These theories, if corroborated, can create exposure not only

to borrowers but also to third party claimants against borrowers. 14

7. Cf. United of Omaha Life Ins. Co. v. Nob Hill Assocs., 450 So. 2d 536 (Fla. 3d D.C.A.
1984) ($2.5 million verdict against lender reversed on appeal because cause of action against
lender for tortious interference with a contract does not exist when lender is a party to the
contract).
8. See NN Investors Life Ins. Co. v. Professional Group, Inc., 468 So. 2d 532, 533 n.2
(Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1985) (tort of economic duress not recognized in Florida); City of Miami v.
Kory, 394 So. 2d 494 (3d D.C.A.) (duress requires a showing of improper external pressure
causing a party to act involuntarily), review denied, 407 So. 2d 1104 (Fla. 1981).
9. See Barnett Bank v. Hooper, 498 So. 2d 923 (Fla. 1986) (bank held to be fiduciary);
Atlantic Nat'l Bank v. Vest, 480 So. 2d 1328, 1333 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1985) (lender found to be
a fiduciary). See also Kalbes v. California Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 497 So. 2d 1256 (Fla. 2d
D.C.A. 1986) (lender owes duty to borrower to disburse loan in compliance with lien law).
10. See Kalbes, 497 So. 2d at 1256 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1986) (case of first impression in Florida).
11. See id. (liability to lendee); Schaeffer v. Gilmer, 353 So. 2d 847 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1977)
(guarantors allowed to raise affirmative defenses to lender's cause of action); Gartner v. Atlantic
Natl Bank, 350 So. 2d 495 (1st D.C.A. 1977) (bank's negligence may materially affect a guarantor's liability to it), cert. denied, 367 So. 2d 1122 (Fla. 1979).
12. See Armetta v. Clevetrust Realty Investors, 359 So. 2d 540, 543 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1978)
(condominium purchasers proceeded against developer's lender on theory of joint venture but
failed to allege any agreement between lender and developer beyond construction financing);
First Wis. Nat'l Bank v. Roose, 348 So. 2d 610, 611 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1977) (condominium owner
failed to allege sufficient facts to support theory of joint venture between mortgagee and developer).
13. See Dunson v. Stockton, Whatley, Davin & Co., 346 So. 2d 603, 606 (Fla. 1st D.C.A.
1977) (identities of mortgagor and mortgagee merged into one when mortgagee took over
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This wide ranging arsenal is modifying the balance of power in the
judicial forum, the ultimate testing ground for disagreements over
loan transactions. Correspondingly, lender liability claims are redefining the environment of lender and borrower negotiation. In assessing
these shifts, this article examines theories that current law extends
to borrowers allegedly damaged by lender misconduct. Beginning with
traditional claims, and followed by discussion of attempts to enlarge
liability by delineating new lender responsibilities, the article concludes
with analysis of future directions for Florida courts in this rapidly
evolving area.
II.

LENDER LIABILITY: THE TRADITIONAL THEORIES

The recent explosion of lender liability claims does not require for
its sustenance exotic theory. Breach of contract remains a borrower's
mainstay. A simple form of that claim is the borrower's contention
that he was orally promised a loan or other considerations by a lender.
Assuming the promise is capable of performance within a year, the
Statute of Frauds does not require it to be in writing. 15 Accordingly,
breach of an oral funding promise is, without more, actionable under
16
Florida law and a source of serious potential exposure.
In efforts to dismiss such claims summarily, lenders typically rely
upon the parol evidence rule providing that oral agreements are
preempted by the unambiguous written terms of loan documents.' 7
Thus, while a party may claim that an oral agreement was made prior
to the execution of loan documents, once signed, those papers supersede prior discussions and oral understandings not included in the
8
documents.

mortgagor's operation); see also Schaeffer v. Gilmer, 353 So. 2d 847, 853 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1977)
(allowed counterclaim that lender 'took over" project).
14. See Dunson, 346 So. 2d at 603 (lender subject to claim of home buyers against borrowerdeveloper); see also Connor v. Great W. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 60 Cal. 2d 850, 447 P.2d 609, 73
Cal. Rptr. 369 (1968) (lender held liable to home'purchasers despite lack of privity).
15. See FLA. STAT. § 725.01 (1987) (statute of frauds).
16. The damages generally available for breach of lending agreements are described in
Financial Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Continental Enter., Inc., 338 So. 2d 907, 908 (Fla. 3d
D.C.A. 1976). The court held that it is proper to value future damages at present money value. Id.
17. Bryant v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 130 So. 2d 132, 134 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1961).
18. See, e.g., Taran v. Sea Coast Appliance Distrib., Inc., 164 So. 2d 274, 275 (Fla. 3d
D.C.A. 1964) (since loan document was unambiguous, 'Its written terms absorb any prior oral
agreements"). See also Florida State Bank v. Honey, 407 So. 2d 1082 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1982)
(reversing trial court for admitting parol evidence in contradiction of terms of guaranty).
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Thus, for obvious reasons, the parol evidence rule is the lender's
champion. Armed with provisions that are almost invariably favorable
to the lender, success is usually assured if determination of obligations
and liabilites is confined to the loan documents. The borrower's position, however, may rely upon oral assurances allegedly given by lending officers which, if withheld from consideration, leave the borrower
with little ability to litigate. 19
The parol evidence rule itself, however, is subject to various exceptions. First, if written terms are ambiguous, extrinsic circumstances
are admissible to resolve uncertainty. 2° Nor will an oral agreement
reached after execution of loan documents merge with written terms,
although other challenges may apply to subsequent oral modifications
of written contracts.2 1 Notwithstanding the rule, parol evidence may
also be used in the absence of express terms that cross-reference or
incorporate different documents.22 Finally, Florida case law provides
that parol evidence is admissible to show a condition precedent to a
signer's obligations even in the face of an unambiguous loan. 23
Thus, in Northwestern Bank v. Cortner,? a guarantor successfully
defended a claim based upon an unambiguous guaranty by introducing

19. See First Nat'l City Bank (InterAmerica) v. Metal Trading Co., 71 F.R.D. 363, 365
(S.D. Fla. 1976) (parol evidence is admissible to show lack of consideration but may not be
introduced when defense attempts to establish different parol agreement); New York Fin., Inc.
v. J & W Holding Co., 396 So. 2d 802 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1981) (rejecting borrower's defenses and
directing entry of summary judgment against borrower's president).
20. See Foster v. Terenio, 158 Fla. 883, 30 So. 2d 531 (1947) (parol evidence admissible to
show agreement where the document is inconclusive); Bryant v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp.,
130 So. 2d 132, 134 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1961) (parol evidence admissible to determine party intentions).
21. See Pan Am. Eng'g Co. v. Poncho's Constr. Co., 387 So. 2d 1052 (Fla. 5th D.C.A.
1980) (oral modification allowed even though contract required agreements to be in writing).
22. See Jackson v. Parker, 153 Fla. 622, 638, 15 So. 2d 451, 460 (1943); Northwestern Bank
v. Cortner, 275 So. 2d 317, 319 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1973). Cf. Warner v. Caldwell, 354 So. 2d 91
(3d D.C.A. 1977) (construing various documents together based upon explicit cross-reference
contained in guaranty), cert. denied, 361 So. 2d 836 (Fla. 1978).
23. See Bassato v. Denicola, 80 So. 2d 353, 354 (Fla. 1955); Jackson v. Parker, 153 Fla.
622, 638, 15 So. 2d 451, 460 (1943); Northwestern Bank v. Cortner, 275 So. 2d 317, 319 (Fla.
2d D.C.A. 1973). Cf. Duncan Properties, Inc. v. Key Largo Ocean View, Inc., 360 So. 2d 471
(Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1978) (apparently enforcing condition precedent obligating lender to release
parcels from mortgage; promise appeared to be oral).
An additional exception to the parol evidence rule permits a party defending a claim based
on unambiguous loan documents to raise as an offset or counterclaim, issues arising from transactions independent from the sued upon instruments. First Nat'l City Bank (InterAmerica) v.
Metal Trading Co., 71 F.R.D. 363, 365 (S.D. Fla. 1976); Payne v. Nicholson, 100 Fla. 1459,
1462, 131 So. 324, 326 (Fla. 1930).
24. 275 So. 2d 317 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1973).
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parol evidence to show that he signed upon the understanding that
the terms of a separate loan agreement would control the guaranty.
The court ruled that this understanding constituted a condition precedent to liability even though the separate loan agreement was not
mentioned in the guaranty and was not signed until after the guaranty
was executed.2 Although Cortner has not been widely discussed in
subsequent decisions, it potentially creates a gaping loophole in the
parol evidence rule. Arguably, oral understandings about preconditions
to a loan such as the separate loan agreement considered in Cortner
are precisely the sort of unwritten terms that unambiguous documents
are intended to displace. By allowing unwritten agreements to survive
the execution of documents, so long as the understandings are called
conditions precedent, artful pleading may evade the intended effect
of the parol evidence rule.
In addition to showing a condition precedent, Florida law permits
parol evidence to establish several defenses based upon consideration.26
Whether the written documents recite that the stated consideration
has already been received by the obligor, extrinsic evidence can be
used to establish that no such consideration was actually furnished
and therefore prove the defense of lack of consideration.7
Even more significant, however, is the rule that parol evidence
does not bar evidence of orally promised considerations when the
designated consideration in the agreement is nominal.2 A circumstance
that apparently is rarely exploited by borrowers is that many standard
form loan documents, especially guaranties, recite a nominal consideration such as "ten dollars and other good and valuable considerations."
Under Florida law, such a definition gives the obligor broad license
to claim various oral promises based upon at least two different
rationales. First, settled doctrine provides that recital of nominal consideration such as "ten dollars" cannot realistically prescribe all the
inducements for signing the instrument and, therefore, evidence will
be allowed to show the true consideration.2 Moreover, because the
25. Id. at 320. While Florida law has always permitted parol evidence to show conditional
delivery of an instrument, that character of condition precedent is fundamentally different from
Cortner'sallowance of an extrinsic agreement. E.g., Evan v. United Benefit Fire Ins. Co., 192
So. 2d 87 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1966).
26. Wagner v. Bonucelli, 239 So. 2d 619 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1970).
27. E.g., Diesel Heat Power, Inc. v. Dixon Marine Indus. Power Transmission, Inc., 232
F.2d 217 (5th Cir. 1956) (applying Florida law).
28. J.C. Vereen & Sons, Inc. v. City of Miami, 397 So. 2d 979, 982 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1981)
(where payment of valuable consideration becomes material question, it must be affirmatively
proven by party opponent).
29. Id.; see also Schwartz v. Zaconick, 68 So. 2d 175 (Fla. 1953) (parol evidence admissible
to show true consideration).
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words "other good and valuable considerations" explicitly contemplate
other inducements, they explicitly authorize the obligor to offer proof
of an assortment of promises allegedly made by the lender. 3° As a
result, the lender attempting to enforce form documents that fail to
define carefully the true consideration underlying the transaction may
find little protection from the parol evidence rule.
In addition to oral agreements and conditions precedent, borrowers
may also claim under the loan documents themselves for failure to
advance promised funding. In attempting to rely upon written provisions that obligate the lender to extend funding, however, the borrower generally confronts various preconditions to any such obligation,
sometimes containing seemingly technical requirements that the borrower has ignored21 To enforce the written promise, a borrower must
often overcome countervailing terms in the documents which purport
to justify the lender's failure to perform due to the borrower's noncompliance with preconditions.
To excuse a failure to comply with lender preconditions, the borrower must disclaim either the materiality of those preconditions or
else show that they have been waived. While materiality is generally
determined by the circumstances of each case, the transcending
analysis is whether particular preconditions are germane to protection
of the lender's security for the loan.32 Thus, while compliance with
provisions that do not safeguard the collateral may be deemed immaterial, the borrower's failure to maintain insurance or pay taxes for
mortgaged property will ordinarily justify default and termination of
the lender's further duty to fund.
Waiver is another major battleground for lender liability litigation.
When a court finds that the preconditions underlying the lender's
30.

Miallard v. Ewing, 121 Fla. 654, 663, 164 So. 674, 678 (1935) (evidence of consideration

admissible where consistent with written instrument).
31. United States Life Ins. Co. v. Town & Country Hosp., Inc., 390 So. 2d 71, 73 (Fla.
2d D.C.A. 1980), American Nat'l Bank v. Norris, 368 So. 2d 897 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1979).
32. See Nazarro v. Moksel, 483 So. 2d 884 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1986) (foreclosure reversed

where failure to pay taxes by certain date was not borrower's fault, was promptly cured, and
caused no impairment to security); Schechtman v. Grobbel, 226 So. 2d 1, 3 (Fla. 2d D.C.A.
1969) (foreclosure denied since the only breach was making payments to bank rather than to
mortgagee). See also St. Martin v. McGee, 82 So. 2d 736, 737 (Fla. 1955) (even demolition of

building on mortgaged property not a material default since no impairment to lender's security
resulted).
33. See Walker v. Cone, 142 Fla. 253, 194 So. 631 (1940) (failure to pay insurance a material
default); Millett v. Herez, 418 So. 2d 1067 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1982) (non-payment of taxes deemed
material). See also United States Life Ins. Co. v. Town & Country Hosp., Inc., 390 So. 2d 71,
73 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1980) (obtaining building permit and completing the footings and foundation

were conditions to be met by borrowers before lender was obligated to provide the loan).
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assertions of default have previously been waived, the lender's precipitous default becomes in itself wrongful and a predicate for liability
for the compensable damages that result.
In American National Bank v. Norris,s the court held that the
lender improperly terminated its lending to the borrower when it
asserted the borrower's failure to complete construction within twentyfour months as a basis of default. Because the lender continued its
dealings and negotiations with the borrower even after it became clear
that the project could not be timely completed, the court found that
the deadline had been waived.36 A similar result occurred in another
case when a lender's continued acceptance of payments, with knowledge of substantial non-monetary defaults, supported a finding that
those defaults had been waived. 7
Careful documentation can help avoid waiver problems. By confirming in writing its position that, irrespective of continued dealings, the
lender was not abandoning or foregoing preconditions in the loan documents, the lender in United States Life Insurancev. Town & Country
Hospital, Inc.3defeated a claim that its post-default negotiations effected a waiver.
To guard against waiver, lenders frequently insert in loan documents provisions which specify that a failure to assert a default or
remedy under the loan documents will not constitute a waiver of that
prerogative. In other contexts, Florida courts have held that such
non-waiver provisions are effective, at least when the conduct effecting
a waiver is limited in duration and scope. 39 Even so, longstanding

34. See American Nat'l Bank v. Norris, 368 So. 2d 897 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1979). See also
Hospital Mortgage Group v. First Prudential Dev. Corp., 411 So. 2d 181, 183 (Fla. 1982) (to
prevail against lender repudiating funding obligation, borrower must show either compliance or
ability to comply with conditions precedent). Cf. Schaeffer v. Gilmer, 353 So. 2d 847, 853 (Fla.
1st D.C.A. 1977) (valid defense stated based on allegations that lender refused to disburse
despite borrower's fulfillment of conditions precedent).
35. 368 So. 2d 897 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1979).
36. Id. at 898. The borrower testified that loan officers "openly ratified and acquiesced in
his effort to resolve the construction problem." Id.
37. Flagler Center Bldg. Loan Corp. v. Chemical Realty Corp., 363 So. 2d 344, 347 (Fla.
3d D.C.A. 1978). A finding of waiver was based on circumstances including further funding by
the lender beyond the date of default. Id. The trial court found the funding created the belief
that the loan was still in effect and induced the borrower to change positions "by giving the
right and opportunity to complete the building by the deadline." Id. The trial court held that
although the lender's continued funding "was done with noble, commendable motives, it nevertheless constituted a waiver." Id. at 346 n.3.
38. 363 So. 2d 71, 73 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1980).
39. Philpot v. Bouchele, 411 So. 2d 1341, 1344-45 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1982) (dispute between
lessor and lessee).
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doctrine of contract law suggests that such provisions cannot be relied
upon in all circumstances. As masters of their contract, parties retain
the right to modify the agreement by any means they choose. A
sufficient showing of conduct inconsistent with the assertion of particular rights under loan documents could thus create a waiver even of
the non-waiver provisions.40
For the borrower who succeeds upon a breach of contract claim
in Florida, whether oral or written, the full extent of recoverable
damages has not been clearly delineated. At a minimum, the aggrieved
borrower can recover any funds paid to the lender as fees to secure
the loan commitment that was later breached. 41 Also settled is the
borrower's right to recover the added expense of securing financing
elsewhere following the initial lender's wrongful refusal to fund . 2
A more difficult question is the extent of compensation available
for the enterprise destroyed by precipitous lender action. Florida decisions have thus far extended only limited analysis to such damage
elements as the borrower's investment in a business, or the equity in
the project prior to the wrongful lender action. Because these elements
of damages seem recoverable under ordinary contract principles, logic
compels allowing them in lender litigation.4 Lost profits, another potential item of damages, however, are generally subject to stringent
limiting criteria. Moreover, because damages arising from contract
40. Id. See City of Gainesville v. Charter Leasing Corp., 483 So. 2d 465, 467 (Fla. 1st
D.C.A. 1986) (non-waiver provisions are apparently disfavored and narrowly construed). See
also Pan Am. Eng'g Co. v. Poncho's Constr. Co., 387 So. 2d 1052, 1053 (Fla. 5th D.C.A. 1980)
(written contracts may be modified by conduct of the parties); Barile Excavating v. Vacuum
UnderDrain, 362 So. 2d 117, 119 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1978) (written contracts may be modified by
subsequent oral agreements of the parties). In these cases the courts hold that written contracts
can be modified by subsequent oral agreement even though the contract purports to prohibit
such modification. See also Fletcher v. Laguna Vista Corp., 275 So. 2d 579, 580 (Fla. 1st D.C.A.
1973) (waiver affected by course of dealings).
41. Plantation Key Developers, Inc. v. Colonial Mortgage Co., 589 F.2d 164, 169-70 (5th
Cir. 1979).
42. Financial Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Continental Enter., Inc., 338 So. 2d 907, 908 (Fla.
3d D.C.A. 1976). To compute damages for obtaining other financing, the added cost of interest
is aggregated over the life of the loan and then reduced to present value. Id. See also United
of Omaha Life Ins. Co. v. Nob Hill Assocs., 450 So. 2d 536, 540 (Fla.3d D.C.A. 1984) (measure
of damages is added cost of substitute loan reduced to present value).
43. Contract damages are based upon losses that are "naturally and proximately resulting
from the breach, or such as may reasonably be supported to have been within the contemplation
of both parties at the time they made the contract . . . ." TuttlefWhite Constructors, Inc. v.
Montgomery Elevator Co., 385 So. 2d 98, 100 (Fla. 5th D.C.A. 1980).
44. See A & P Bakery Supply v. Hawatmeh, 388 So. 2d 1071, 1072 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1980)
(absent a record of past profitability, lost profits are too speculative to sustain recovery). See
also Babe, Inc. v. Baby's Formula Serv., Inc., 165 So. 2d 795, 798 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1964) (lost
profits too speculative and remote to be recoverable).
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claims are more limited than tort recoveries due to the doctrine of
Hadley v. Baxendale,45 contract claimants continue to confront doctrine
46
that limits recoverable damages against lenders.
Tort theories, on the other hand, overcome barriers such as the

parol evidence rule and the limitation of damages to losses contemplated by the parties. 47 In the lending context, the foremost theory
is frequently common law fraud. A claimant alleging that a lender
orally contracted to advance loans beyond those specified in writing
may nonetheless be extinguished by the parol evidence rule.48 If instead of relying only upon contract theory, the borrower further alleges that the lender fradulently induced execution of a written loan

agreement through false oral promises, the parol evidence rule is
discarded, and the lender faces greater exposure to the broader tort
compensatory damage formula, and punitive damages. 49 Even a con-

45. 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854). This famous case is still cited in Florida discussions of damages
for breach of contract. E.g., Hobbley v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 450 So. 2d 332, 333 (Fla. 1st
D.C.A. 1984) (embarrassment not compensable in a contract action) (citing Brock v. Gale, 14
Fla. 523 (1874)). See also Henry Morrison Flagler Museum v. Lee, 268 So. 2d 434, 436-37 (Fla.
4th D.C.A. 1972) (pain and anguish not compensable in contract claim).
46. It is long settled law that contract claims by themselves do not authorize awards of
punitive damages. American Int'l Land Corp. v. Hanna, 323 So. 2d 567, 569-70 (Fla. 1975).
Other doctrines further limit damages in particular contractual contexts. E.g., Vogel v. Vandiver,
373 So. 2d 366, 367 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1975). In Vogel and Horton, courts applied the rule that
"loss of bargain" damages cannot be awarded to a purchaser of realty unless it can be shown
that the defaulting vendor breached the agreement in bad faith. Such a limitation could be
analogized to "loss of bargain" claims in lending agreements where the alleged losses involved
real property.
Applying another doctrine limiting contract damages, the court in Tuttle/White Constructors,
Inc. v. Montgomery Elevator Co., 385 So. 2d 98 (Fla. 5th D.C.A. 1980), referred to losses
"within the contemplation of both parties . . . ." Id. at 100. But see Greater Coral Springs
Realty, Inc. v. Century 21 Real Estate of S. Fla., Inc., 412 So. 2d 940, 940-41 (Fla.3d D.C.A.
1981) (holding that contract claims allow a broader recovery under benefit of the bargain analysis).
47. E.g. Tinker v. De Maria Porsche Audi, Inc., 459 So. 2d 487, 491 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1984)
(parol evidence rule inapplicable to fraud in the inducement claim). In measuring damages, tort
principles generally afford flexibility in assuring that "an award should be equal to and precisely
commensurate with the injury sustained." Page v. Matthews, 386 So. 2d 815, 817 (Fla. 5th
D.C.A. 1980). In appropriate cases, the value of the owner's equity in property is the proper
measure of damages. Id.
48. Fannin v. Fritter, 127 Fla. 97, 100, 172 So. 691, 693 (1937) (exculpatory collateral
agreement precluded); Forbes v. Ft. Lauderdale Mercantile Co., 83 Fla. 66, 70-71, 90 So. 821,
823 (1922) (fraud insufficiently pled; inconsistent contemporaneous agreement insufficient).
49. Griffith v. Shamrock Village, Inc., 94 So. 2d 854, 858 (Fla. 1957) (punitive damages
only available in contract settings if conduct "amounts to a cause of action in tort"). See Nicholas
v. Miami Burglar Alarm Co., Inc., 339 So. 2d 175, 178 (Fla. 1976) (punitive damages recoverable
where "acts constituting a breach of contract also amount to a cause of action in tort").
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spicuous disclaimer expressly stating that oral representations may
not be relied upon cannot avoid a claim that oral misrepresentations
fraudulently induced the obligor to sign the document. 50
Fraud is a crucial armament, even in the age of supposedly more
sophisticated borrower claims. Moreover, while the pleading requirements for fraud are exacting, 51 at least five developments in Florida
law have enhanced its effectiveness in the hands of the claimant. First,
successful proof of a fraud claim is no longer measured by a "clear
and convincing" standard but is instead governed by the "preponderance of the evidence" test that governs civil cases. 2 Second, a claimant's failure to investigate the facts represented by the fraudulent
actor is no longer a complete defense to a fraud claim.5 Third, in
circumstances not clearly defined, courts have expanded the scope of
actionable fraud beyond affirmative misrepresentations to reach nondisclosure of material facts.5 Fourth, even an unintentional misrep-

resentation, if negligently made, is apparently actionable in Florida
although this cause of action also has vaguely defined contours. 5 Finally, and of critical tactical importance, courts generally hold that a
properly pleaded fraud action cannot be resolved by summary judgment . 6 A borrower raising fraud can thus typically preserve that claim

50. Tinker v. De Maria Porsche Audi, Inc., 459 So. 2d 487, 491 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1984).
51. FLA. R. Cw. P. 1.120. See Tampa Farm Serv., Inc. v. Cargill, Inc., 356 So. 2d 347,
351 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1978) (fraud must be alleged with "certainty, clarity, directness and particularity"); Ocala Loan Co. v. Smith, 155 So. 2d 711, 716 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1963) ("facts must be
stated with such particularity as the circumstances permit"). The Supreme Court of Florida has
defined the elements of fraud as (1) a representation on which plaintiff was meant to act, (2) a
representation that the defendant knew to be false, and (3) the reliance of plaintiff upon the
representation resulting in injury. American Int'l Land Corp. v. Hanna, 323 So. 2d 567, 569
(Fla. 1975).
52. See Watson Realty Corp. v. Quinn, 452 So. 2d 568 (Fla. 1984), recedingfrom, Canal
Auth. v. Ocala Mfg. Ice & Packing Co., 332 So. 2d 321 (Fla. 1976).
53. See Besett v. Basnett, 389 So. 2d 995, 998 (Fla. 1980) (failure to undertake an investigation of the facts is only a defense to a fraud claim when the claimant knew the representation
was false or its falsity was obvious), overruling, Potakar v. Hurtak, 82 So. 2d 502 (Fla. 1955);
Foxfire Inn v. Neff, 433 So. 2d 1304 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1983).
54. See Telesphere Int'l, Inc. v. Scollin, 489 So. 2d 1152 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1986); Nessim v.
DeLoache, 384 So. 2d 1341, 1344 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1980) (citing Columbus Hotel Corp. v. Hotel
Management Co., 116 Fla. 464, 156 So. 893 (1934)); Ramel v. Chasebrook Constr. Co., 135 So.
2d 876 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1961). In Johnson v. Davis, 480 So. 2d 625 (Fla. 1985), the Supreme
Court of Florida required sellers of homes to disclose material defects.
55. See Century 21 Admiral's Port, Inc. v. Walker, 471 So. 2d 544 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1985);
Ostreyko v. B.C. Morton Org., Inc., 310 So. 2d 316, 318 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1975) (negligent
misrepresentation is tantamount to actionable fraud).
56. E.g., Public Health Trust v. Prudential Ins. Co., 415 So. 2d 896 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1982).
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with its accompanying danger to the lender for months or even years
of litigation and, afterwards, compel a lender to face fraud charges in
a trial by jury.57 The tactical implications of such a claim are therefore

substantial. 5
Among the edges of fraud sharpened by Florida courts in recent

years, two with especially intriguing ramifications for lenders are the
duty of disclosure and so-called negligent misrepresentation. A financial institution's duty to disclose was the subject of the 1986 decision
in Barnett Bank of West Florida v. Hooper,59 in which the Supreme

Court of Florida created a dilemma for financial institutions. Noting
existing case law holding a bank liable for disclosing information about
its customers, 60 the court held that in some circumstances the lender
could be liable for not disclosing the confidential information.6 1 In

57. In lender cases, tactical objectives ordinarily center around speedy disposition so that
collateral can be obtained and sold before depreciation of the collateral and further increase of
interest create a shortfall between security and the lender's loan investment. Summary judgment
is the vehicle lenders rely upon in resolving loan cases promptly. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.510. E.g.,
New York Fin., Inc. v. J & W Holding Co., 396 So. 2d 802 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1981) (liability
upon note established through summary judgment); Reflex, N.V. v. Umet Trust, 336 So. 2d
473, 475 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1976) ("paper issues" should not forestall lender's right to summary
judgment).
58. Lenders who fail to obtain summary judgment, not only lose the advantage of speedy
recovery of collateral, but can face exposure to a jury which many lenders believe is unsympathetic to financial institutions. E.g., State Nat'l Bank v. Farah Mfg. Co., 678 S.W.2d 661, 699
(Tex. Ct. App. 1984) ($18.6 million jury award against bank).
59. 498 So. 2d 923 (Fla. 1986).
60. Id. at 925 (citing Milohnich v. First Nat'l Bank, 224 So. 2d 759 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1969))
(bank owes implied duty to customers to refrain from disclosing information about accounts).
Cf. Divison of PariMutual Wagering, Dep't of Business Reg. v. Winfield, 443 So. 2d 455 (Fla.
4th D.C.A. 1984). The general duty of confidentiality does not apply if disclosure is made (1)
under compulsion of law, (2) pursuant to public interest, or (3) when the bank's interest requires
disclosure, or (4) with the express or implied consent of the customer. 498 So. 2d at 761. In
Hooper, the court approved these exemptions but added a generalized "special circumstances
exception." Id. at 925.
In addition to the common law duty, particular statutes and regulations limit the disclosure
of certain documents and records. FDIC v. Stewart, 445 So. 2d 590 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1984);
Hialeah-Miami Springs First State Bank v. B.S. Enter., Inc., 353 So. 2d 1243 (Fla. 3d D.C.A.
1978); 12 C.F.R. § 261.7(b) (1987); FLA. STAT. § 655.057(1) (1987).
61. 498 So. 2d at 925. In Hooper, the court held that "special circumstances" could require
a bank to disclose confidential information. Id. In that case, those circumstances existed because
the bank helped the victim of nondisclosure transfer substantial sums to another bank customer
whom the bank suspected of check kiting schemes. Id. at 924-25. By allowing the victim to
deposit sums in the crooked customer's account, the bank was able to recover from that account
an $87,000 overdraft. Id. at 926. Accordingly, the court held that these circumstances presented
a claim worthy of jury consideration. Id.
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determining the appropriate course in this cross-fire of conflicting
liabilities, the court in Hooper concluded that the unusual facts of that
case may have required disclosure. In Hooper, one bank customer was
being defrauded by another customer of the same bank. The bank had
information that, if furnished to the victim, might have prevented the
fraud.u Because the bank apparently withheld such information based
on its own self-interest and thus actually benefited from the fraud it
allowed to happen,63 the court held that the victimized customer may
have a valid claim against the bank. Purporting to express its holding
in limited terms, the supreme court emphasized that Barnett Bank
had previously enjoyed a fiduciary relationship with the victimized
customer. 3
While the fact pattern of Hooperis uncommon, its so-called limited
features may not confine its impact. The court's conclusion that Barnett
Bank owed fiduciary duties to the victimized customer was not
explained, but apparently rested upon the fact that the claimant had
been a customer for nine years.6 5 The implications of imposing fiduciary
duties in such circumstances are disturbing and are discussed in
greater detail in a later section of this article.
Barnett Bank gained financially by its silence. When a financial
institution declines to give information about a customer, the facts of
a case may reveal benefits that the institution could obtain from the
silence. While in Hooper, the bank's gain was immediately tangible,
self-enhancement can be found in most situations in which a bank
declines to disclose embarrassing or damaging information about a
customer. A bank might avoid giving negative information simply to
foster a profitable relationship with the customer. Financial benefit
could also be found when a bank fails to give information injurious to
a customer who is in arrears on loan obligations, which could help a
struggling customer recover, prosper, and ultimately repay the bank.
Ironically, one could even argue that a bank benefits from non-disclosure because it avoids the liabilities that confront it for giving out
confidential information about a customer.r6 Accordingly, rather than

62. Id. at 924. Prior to the fraud, bank personnel had become suspicious that Hosner, the
customer perpetrating the fraud, was involved in check kiting and the bank was therefore
dishonoring Hosner's checks. Id.
63. Id. at 925. By not warning the plaintiff and instead allowing him to deposit almost
$90,000 in Hosner's account at Barnett Bank, the bank was able to off-set and avoid an overdraft
of roughly $87,000 in that account. Id. at 924.
64. Id. at 925.
65. Id. at 924.
66. E.g., Milohnich v. First Nat'l Bank, 224 So. 2d 759 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1969).
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a circumscribed holding, Hooper presents a disturbing dilemma for
banks and lenders who now face potential liabilities for failing to disclose. At the same time, disclosure itself can be an actionable violation
of the lender's obligation of confidentiality.
While the court in Hooper premised the bank's duty to disclose
upon its fiduciary obligations to its customer, even without such a
relationship, Florida courts are establishing liability for deliberate and
deceptive withholding of information. Apart from confidential relations, a duty to disclose has apparently been imposed in some cases
solely because one party has "superior knowledge" of circumstances
that are unavailable to the other party. 7 Although not dealing directly
with loan transactions, cases holding that sellers of homes have duties
to disclose to buyers,e or that employers cannot deliberately withhold
facts from prospective employees, 69 should be troubling for lenders.
Because the basis for imposing a duty to disclose in such cases is
superior knowledge, a lender may have broad obligations because it
will frequently have superior knowledge of various facts. Thus, because
a construction lender will often have superior knowledge of the borrower's financial condition, if the project fails, unpaid vendors and
personnel of the borrower may claim that the lender should have
disclosed any facts showing financial difficulties. Even in ordinary
consumer transactions, a borrower unhappy with the automobile or
home purchased may allege that the lender's greater expertise in
analyzing these assets for lending purposes constitutes superior knowledge, obligating the lender to disclose all material facts at its disposal
concerning such property. Therefore, until subsequent case law
clarifies whether superior knowledge alone is sufficient to impose a
duty to disclose, the horizons are extended for claiming fraudulent
nondisclosure.
Also unsettling for lenders is the dimension of fraud activated by
negligent misrepresentations. Clearly recognized in Florida decisions, 70
67. Telesphere Int'l, Inc. v. Scollin, 489 So. 2d 1152 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1986) (citing Ramel
v. Chasebrook Constr. Co., 135 So. 2d 876 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1961)). In Nessin v. DeLoache,

Florida's Third District Court of Appeal stated "[tihe classic illustration of fraud is where one
party having superior knowledge intentionally fails to disclose a material fact. . . ." 384 So.
2d 1341, 1344 (citing Columbus Hotel Corp. v. Hotel Management Co., 116 Fla. 464, 156 So.
893 (1934)). But see Banks v. Salina, 413 So. 2d 851, 852 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1982) ("In Florida,
there is no duty to disclose when the parties are dealing at arms length.").
68. See Johnson v. Davis, 480 So. 2d 625 (Fla. 1985); Rayner v. Wise Realty Co., 504 So.
2d 1361 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1987).
69. See Telesphere Int'l, Inc. v. Scollin, 489 So. 2d 1152 (3d D.C.A.), rev. denied, 500 So.
2d 546 (Fla. 1986).
70. See Atlantic Nat'l Bank v. Vest, 480 So. 2d 1328, 1331 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1985); Century
21 Admiral's Port, Inc. v. Walker, 471 So. 2d 544 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1985); Ostreyko v. B.C.
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this cause of action appears to embrace all the elements of common
law fraud, but with a markedly different measure of culpability. Rather
than resting upon intentional falsity, this theory of misrepresentation
allows the claimant to prevail if the speaker was merely negligent
about the accuracy of material representations.7 1 Thus, the tort of
negligent misrepresentation obviously requires much less to prove
than ordinary fraud. Moreover, a lending officer speaking for a financial institution is presumably chargeable, for negligence purposes, with
all the information within the institution.7 It may often be easy to
prove that the lender knew or should have known a statement was
incorrect since a lender may have access to extensive data.
Because the full impact of a fraud claim can be generated through
far less demanding proof of a negligent misrepresentation, such a claim
becomes a valuable tool for borrowers. A logical corollary of applying
a negligence standard to affirmative misrepresentations would be
claiming liability based upon failure to disclose that was merely negligent rather than intentional. Lenders' potential liability is compounded still further. Arguably, lenders and banks could develop
duties to disclose and liabilities for negligently omitting facts analogous
to registrants under the federal securities law. This would blend two
apparently settled doctrines of fraud into a cause of action for negligent
failure to disclose, significantly expanding lender exposure.
III.

INTERFERENCE

Along with fraud, a claim for intentional interference by lenders
is a cornerstone of conventional tort weaponry in Florida.73 Under
present law, litigants may complain of disruption of a contractual relationship in which the claimant enjoys legal rights. 74 Case law requires
Morton Org., Inc., 310 So. 2d 316 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1975). But see Taylor v. American Honda
Motor Co., Inc., 555 F. Supp. 59, 64 (M.D. Fla. 1982) (absent a fiduciary duty, trick, or artifice,
"mere non disclosure of material facts in an arm's length transaction is ordinarily not actionable
."); Banks v. Salina, 413 So. 2d 851 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1981).
71. Atlantic Nat'l Bank v. Vest, 480 So. 2d 1328, 1331-32 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1985) (liability
can attach if representor was without knowledge of accuracy of statement or ought to have
known of its falsity). In ordinary fraud cases, a claimant must show that the defendant actually
knew the representation was false when made. E.g., American Int'l Land Corp. v. Hanna, 323
So. 2d 567, 569 (Fla. 1975).
72. Cf. Taylor v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc., 555 F. Supp. 59, 64 (M.D. Fla. 1983)
("Florida law... charges a claimant with knowledge of all facts that could have been learned
through diligent inquiry.").
73. E.g., United of Omaha Life Ins. Co. v. Nob Hill Assocs., 450 So. 2d 536 (Fla. 3d
D.C.A. 1984); Smith v. Ocean State Bank, 335 So. 2d 641 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1976).
74. E.g., International Funding Corp. v. Krasner, 360 So. 2d 1156, 1157 (Fla. 3d D.C.A.
1978).
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showing that the interference was effected intentionally and that actual
damages resulted. 7 Thus, lender action that infringes upon a borrower's relationship with other lenders, the borrower's customers or
its vendors, may give rise to an interference claim if litigation ensues. 76
At least one borrower has argued that a lender is liable for the interference that a breach creates with relations between the borrower
and third parties.7 However, the court rejected the borrower's argument on the grounds that a lender cannot be held liable for interfering
with its own contract. 78
Although Florida courts are consistent in defining the elements of
interference, a critical defense to this tort has been formulated less
clearly. Florida law permits a defense of privilege excusing otherwise
actionable interference when the interfering action comprises steps
taken in furtherance of the interfering party's own economic self-interest. 79 For lenders, this can be an important defense because claims
against them typically arise when lenders act to enforce their rights
under loan agreements.80 Despite the frequent availability of the
privilege defense, it will rarely sustain summary disposition of interference claims. While a lender may be able to demonstrate furtherance
of its own economic self-interest as a matter of law, the reasonableness

75. E.g., Lake Gateway Motor Inn, Inc. v. Matt's Sunshine Gift Shops, Inc., 361 So. 2d
769, 771 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1978). Although some decisions refer to "tortious interference with
contract" and others to "tortious interference with business relationship," the claims embrace
the same cause of action differing only in whether a contract as opposed to a business relationship
is the object of disruption. Smith v. Ocean State Bank, 335 So. 2d 641, 642 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1976).
76. See Melamed v. Lake County Nat'l Bank, 727 F.2d 1399, 1403-04 (6th Cir. 1984) (the
federal appeals court found a valid interference claim against a lender who imposed a 13 point
plan ranging from selection of its account to reducing the president's salary).
77. See United of Omaha Life Ins. Co. v. Nob Hill Assocs., 450 So. 2d 526 (Fla. 3d D.C.A.
1984).
78. Id. at 539.
79. Yoder v. Shell Oil Co., 405 So. 2d 743 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1981) (privilege arises from
financial interest in the subject matter in the nature of an investment).
80. Lenders typically have a security interest in the borrower's property and, in many
cases, in receivables accruing from third parties. Such an interest should be sufficient to establish
privilege. Ethyl Corp. v. Balter, 386 So. 2d 1220 (3d D.C.A. 1980) (interfering defendant enjoyed
privilege by virtue of position as major creditor and co-obligor), cert. denied, 392 So. 2d 1371
(Fla. 1981), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 955 (1981); Nitzberg v. Zalesky, 370 So. 2d 389 (Fla. 3d
D.C.A. 1979) (interfering defendant a mortgage holder). Additionally, specific provisions often
authorize lenders to undertake steps such as approving or rejecting subcontractors that are
alleged to constitute interference with the subcontractor's right to perform on the job. Absent
proof of malicious intent, however, assertion of such a contract right should not be actionable.
Florida Tel. Corp. v. Essig, 468 So. 2d 543 (Fla. 5th D.C.A. 1985).
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of those actions, the other ingredient of this defense, will often present

factual questions that must be resolved at trial. s'
While lenders may have a defense of privilege, it will not always
avoid protracted litigation or a trial by jury. Interference, like fraud,
is a tort action with a wide scope of compensatory and punitive damages,2 which can present significant risk to lenders in Florida.
IV.

DURESS

To establish duress, a showing is required that one party exerted
so much pressure that another was unable to exercise free will. In
Florida, duress is not confined to physical duress, but may also be
financial. Also described as economic or business compulsion, a claim
of economic duress requires showing not only that the coercive party
had no legal right to pressure the other in a particular fashion, but
also that the threatened actions would financially destroy the borrower."
Therefore, a lender that threatens to call a demand note in order
to secure some advantage from the borrower acts within its rights,
6
regardless of the potential ruin imperiling the borrower. But if
threats of foreclosure or other adverse lender action are made to gain

81. See Insurance Field Serv., Inc. v. White & White Inspection Audit Serv., Inc., 384
So. 2d 303, 306-07 (Fla. 5th D.C.A. 1980) (determining liability requires balancing social and
private objectives).
82. In United of Omaha Life Ins. Co. v. Nob Hill Assocs., 450 So. 2d 536, 538 (Fla. 3d
D.C.A. 1984), the jury verdict, later reversed on appeal, included $1,750,000 in compensatory
damages and $750,000 in punitive damages against institutional lender based upon an interference
claim.
83. The Supreme Court of Florida has explained this principle saying that duress "practically
destroys the free agency of a party and causes him to do an act or make a contract not of his
own volition." Herald v. Hardin, 95 Fla. 889, 891, 116 So. 863, 864 (1928).
84. See City of Miami v. Kory, 394 So. 2d 494 (3d D.C.A.), cert. denied, 407 So. 2d 1104
(Fla. 1981). Even the fact that advice of counsel is obtained in signing a document does not
preclude finding that consent was obtained through duress. Corporacion Peruana de Aeropuertos
y Aviacion Comercial v. Boy, 180 So. 2d 503, 506 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1965).
85. See Scutti v. State Rd. Dep't, 220 So. 2d 628, 630 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1969) ("duress or
business compulsion" a valid defense); Mimaroe, Inc. v. Sanitary Serv. Co., 185 So. 2d 177 (Fla.
3d D.C.A. 1966) (summary judgment reversed due to genuine factual issue as to whether
agreement was signed as a result of "economic compulsion").
86. See Flagship Natl Bank v. Gray Distrib. Sys., Inc., 485 So. 2d 1336, 1340 (Fla. 3d
D.C.A. 1986); Quest v. Barnett Bank, 397 So. 2d 1020, 1021 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1981); City of
Miami v. Kory, 394 So. 2d 494, 498 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1981) (to threaten another with what one
has a legal right to do is not duress).
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concessions from the borrower when a loan is not in default, the threat
would be improper and serve as a basis for a claim of duress.7
In addition to impropriety, to substantiate duress the borrower
must show that the lender's threatened conduct would have caused
extinction. Threats to a borrower of default, acceleration and assorted
aggressive default remedies would not constitute duress, regardless
of potential hardship, if the borrower could refinance or otherwise
survive the adverse lender action.
In some states, duress is recognized as a separate cause of action
upon which the recovery of damages may be premised. Florida law,
however, recognizes economic duress only as a defense or avoidance
of contractual obligation.9 For example, a borrower compelled to sign
a modification agreement to avoid default and ruination of a project
may seek to cancel the agreement, but may not recover damages
based on duress. Similarly, because lenders often try to obtain releases
when they impose modification upon borrowers, perhaps midway
through a project or in a work-out scenario, a borrower may allege
economic duress to avoid the release. Should the transaction go to
court for resolution, the borrower facing contentions that claims
against the lender were released, may find duress an essential device
in avoiding early summary disposition.91 Accordingly, even though
duress creates no right of affirmative recovery, it can be a crucial
tool in maintaining other claims and in enhancing generally the borrower's tactical position.

87. See City of Miami v. Kory, 394 So. 2d 494, 497 (3d D.C.A.), cert. denied, 407 So. 2d
1104 (Fla. 1981).
88. In Kory, 394 So. 2d at 494, 498, the court ruled that a decision based upon "a deliberate
and considered choice between alternatives" could not be prompted by duress.
89. See Reiver v. Murdoch & Walsh, 625 F. Supp. 998, 1012-13 (D.C. Del. 1985) (a federal
court predicted that a Delaware court would find economic duress as a basis for a cause of
action); Pecos Constr. Co. v. Mortgage Inv. Co., 80 N.M. 680, 459 P.2d 842 (1969); State Nat'l
Bank v. Farah Mfg. Co., 678 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984) (writ dismissed); cf. Alaska State
Bank v. Fairco, 674 P.2d 288 (Alaska 1983) (a finding of duress permits a court to hold that
plaintiff is entitled to punitive damages).
90. See NN Investors Life Ins. Co. v. Professional Group, Inc., 468 So. 2d 532 (Fla. 3d
D.C.A. 1985).
91. See Scutti v. State Rd. Dep't, 220 So. 2d 628, 630 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1969) (waiver
agreement invalidated based on "duress or business compulsion"); Mimaroe, Inc. v. Sanitary
Serv. Co., 185 So. 2d 177, 178 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1968) (reversing summary judgment in view of
duress defense based on "economic compulsion"); First Mortgage Investors v. Boulevard Nat'l
Bank, 327 So. 2d 830, 832 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1976) (summary judgment improper "if the evidence
raises any doubt on an issue of material fact"); cf. City of Miami v. Kory, 394 So. 2d 494 (3d
D.C.A.) (employee who voluntarily resigned rather than be fired was unsuccessful in duress
claim), cert. denied, 407 So. 2d 1104 (Fla. 1981).
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V.

CLAIMS BASED UPON THE SCOPE OF LENDER

DUTY

Along with traditional claims such as breach of contract, fraud,
interference, and duress, borrowers are increasingly making claims
that enlarge lender responsibility. This expansion is often anchored
in countervailing currents of public policy.
Historically, courts have underscored the primacy of the financial
institution's obligations to its depositors, shareholders, and the general
public.9 An institution's performance of these responsibilities is continually and intensively regulated by various federal authorities and,
for state chartered institutions, by the Office of the Florida Comptroller. 93 Many of these responsibilities and their attendant regulation
revolve around effective realization of the loans an institution makes.
Thus, effective action against defaulting borrowers and their collateral
has long served important policy considerations. In opposition to this
traditional view of the lender's role, litigants try to extend responsibilities toward depositors to include borrowers, which is an obligation
that could conflict with aggressive action to recover debts.
Prior to the 1970s, Florida law did not generally impose upon
lenders duties to protect their borrowers.9 Instead, the underlying
predicate of lending was defined as an arm's length creditor and debtor
relationship. 95 In recent years, however, cases have eroded the lender's
insulation from liability for negligence by imposing duties to exercise
reasonable care for protection of the borrower.9
An even more dramatic change in the lender's prerogative to act
as an arm's length creditor occurs when courts impose a fiduciary

92. Sponge Exch. Bank v. Commercial Credit Co., 263 F. 20 (5th Cir.) (policy toward
financial institutions encompasses 'the interest of depositors, stockholders and the public generally"), cert. denied, 253 U.S. 496 (1920).
93. Financial institutions are subject to regulation by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, if chartered as a bank. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1823, 1828 (1982). If chartered as a thrift it is
subject to the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation and the Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve. 12 C.F.R. 201 et. seq. State institutions are subject to the Comptroller
of the State of Florida. 12 U.S.C. § 1823 (1982), 12 C.F.R. § 261 (1987), FLA. STAT. § 655.001-.104
(1987).
94. See, e.g., Rice v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 207 So. 2d 22 (2d D.C.A.), cert. denied,
212 So. 2d 879 (Fla. 1968).
95. See Beauchamp v. Yazoo Valley Oil & Milling Co., 403 So. 2d 554 (Fla. 1st D.C.A.
1981); Armetta v. Clevetrust Realty Investors, 359 So. 2d 540, 543 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1978)
(lender in traditional role of mortgage "lender owed no duty to others to supervise financed
construction"). Cf. Camp v. First Nat'l Bank, 44 Fla. 497, 33 So. 241 (1902) (bank and account
customer have debtor-creditor relationship).
96. E.g., Kalbes v. California Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 497 So. 2d 1256 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1986).
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duty to safeguard the potential adversary, the borrower.9 7 Such a
transformation of law expands prospective lender liability exponentially.
VI.

LENDER NEGLIGENCE AND THE REACH OF ITS DUTY

A lender's liability for intentionally violating agreements, defrauding its borrower or interfering with its borrower's other relationships
rests on the sound premise that every person has a duty to refrain
from violations of contracts and intentional injuries to others9 When
the issue is a lender's failure to exercise ordinary care, however, more
difficult questions arise about duty because the lending relationship
does not generally contemplate an obligation to protect the borrower.9
While lenders and borrowers share common interests in their hope
that the enterprise securing the debt will succeed, their ultimate positions are adversarial.
Loan transaction documents are favorable to the lender and often
seem oppressive to the borrower. The lender benefits from repayment,
while the expense is a detriment to the borrower. When default occurs,
the lender's repayment often occurs through its acquisition of the
borrower's property.
Accordingly, the arm's length character of the debtor creditor relationship would seem to limit the lender's duties to exercise care for
the borrower's benefit. This policy was reflected in the 1968 decision
of Rice v. First Federal Savings & Loan AssociatioWo( which is still
the starting point for analyzing the lender's liability for negligence.
In Rice, the borrower sued his construction lender alleging that the
lender's architect had been negligent in inspecting the construction
site and had overlooked defects in the walls. The court rejected this
claim holding that the lender owed no duty to the borrower to ascertain

97.

See Barnett Bank v. Hooper, 498 So. 2d 923 (Fla. 1986) (bank had duty to disclose

unavailable material information about a transaction to its customer when the bank stood to
benefit at the customer's expense); Atlantic Nat'l Bank v. Vest, 480 So. 2d 1328 (Fla. 2d D.C.A.
1985) (fiduciary relationship arose when customer asked the bank a legal question, although its

duty was satisfied in telling the customer it did not know the answer).
98. Notwithstanding policy concerns respecting financial institutions, no evident rationale
exists for insulating them from obligations that apply across the board to others in commerce.
See supra note 92.
99.

Armetta v. Clevetrust Realty Investors, 359 So. 2d 540 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1978) (provi-

sions intended to benefit the lender do not create a duty to others); Rice v. First Fed. Say. &
Loan Ass'n, 207 So. 2d 22 (3d D.C.A.), (architect's inspection of construction site intended solely
for benefit of lender), cert. denied, 212 So. 2d 879 (Fla. 1968).
100. 207 So. 2d 22 (2d D.C.A.), cert. denied, 212 So. 2d 879 (Fla. 1068).
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construction defects. 0 1 The inspections were found to have been made
solely for the lender's own benefit to determine whether the progress
of construction justified further advances of funding. Since the architect was retained to protect the lender's interest, even though his
fee was paid by the borrower, no duty or liability flowed to the borrower. 12
While subsequent decisions cite Rice approvingly, not all have
shielded lenders from a duty to exercise ordinary care for the benefit
of others. In a decision that adhered to Rice's limitation of lender
duty, the Fourth District Court of Appeal briefly addressed the issue
in First Wisconsin National Bank v. Roose'0 ' when it ruled that a
lender had no obligation to others to supervise construction and
maintenance by the developer. The court held that the lender's duty
was confined to "the one established as a money lender and security
holder."1 4 Reiterating this viewpoint, the Fourth District similarly
rejected a claim in Armetta v. Clevetrust Realty Investors'0 5 that a
lender had a duty to others to supervise construction and development
and ordinarily '"provisions contained in a loan agreement solely for the
protection of the lender do not create a duty on the part of the lender
to others.' ' 0
Several decisions of the First District Court of Appeal, however,
create cracks in the protective wall that was raised around lenders in
Rice. In Schaeffer v. Gilmer,'0 the court briefly treated several affirmative defenses raised by a developer in a foreclosure action brought
by the construction lender. While rejecting any claim that a lender
has a duty to its borrower to supervise construction, 0 8 to disburse
funds "correctly"'1 or to insure that a construction fund is sufficient
to complete a project, 10 other allegations of duty were held to constitute valid defenses. Thus, a claim that the loan was negligently disbursed and grossly mismanaged was held to state a defense."' The

101. Id. at 23.
102. The trial court found that due to the lender's interest in the progress and quality of
construction, it '"vould reasonably be expected to inspect the construction and be entitled to
additional compensation for its additional costs in making such inspection." Id.
103. 348 So. 2d 610 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1977).
104. Id. at 611.
105. 359 So. 2d 540 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1978).
106. Id. at 543.
107. 353 So. 2d 847 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1977).
108. Id. at 851.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 852.
111. Id.
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court accepted a defense based upon allegations that the lenders had
permitted construction to begin on a second building contrary to preconditions in the loan documents.,'? In holding that these allegations
raised valid defenses, the court did not attempt to explain any inconsistency with its rulings that a lender had no duty to disburse funds
correctly. Similarly, no effort was made to reconcile the court's validation of certain negligence defenses with the decisions in Rice or
Roose.
Another First District case relied upon guarantyship doctrine in
allowing guarantors to defend based on the lender's alleged mismanagement of a construction loan. In Gartner v. Atlantic National
Bank,13 the court reversed summary judgment in favor of a construction lender and held that allegations of negligent management of the
construction loan created a potentially viable defense. Nowhere discussing Rice or even its own decision in Schaeffer v. Gilmer, the First
District instead relied upon a line of cases holding that a bank's negligent handling of collateral may be a defense available to guarantors
of the underlying loan."1 The application of guaranty cases to create
lender obligations on a construction project, however, warrants further
scrutiny.
At common law"Ir and under the Uniform Commercial Code," 6 a
secured creditor has certain duties respecting collateral in its possession, including an obligation to prevent unjustified impairment. The
application of this doctrine often centers around collateral in the exclusive possession and custody of the secured creditor. Because a
mortgage lender does not own or possess its borrower's project,17 the
application of duty to maintain the property in construction lending
cases is questionable.
Another shortcoming of Gartner is its failure to delineate the consequences of breaching a duty to safeguard collateral. Because the
court did not indicate whether the lender's duty to manage properly

112. Id.
113. 350 So. 2d 495 (1st D.C.A. 1977), cert. denied, 367 So. 2d 1122 (Fla. 1979).
114. Id. at 498. (citing Dorsy v. Maryland Nat1 Bank, 334 So. 2d 273 (Fla. 3d D.C.A.
1976)); Davis v. 7-Eleven Food Stores, Inc., 294 So. 2d 111 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1974); Jenkins v.
Graham, 237 So. 2d 330 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1970).
115. E.g., Baitcher v. National Indus. Bank, 368 So. 2d 439 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1979); Miami
Natl Bank v. Fink, 174 So. 2d 38 (3d D.C.A.), cert. denied, 180 So. 2d 658 (Fla. 1965).
116.

FLA. STAT. § 673.306 (1987).

117. Florida is a lien state in which a mortgage does not create a conveyance of legal title
or a right to immediate possession of the mortgaged property. Shipp Corp., Inc. v. Charpilloz,
414 So. 2d 1122, 1123 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1982); Washington Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Dade
County, 221 So. 2d 790, 791 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1969); FLA. STAT. § 697.02 (1987).
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the construction loan gave rise merely to a guarantyship defense, or
to a counterclaim against the lender, the holding may support both
borrower options.118 Indeed, some Florida decisions have expressly
ruled that a breach of a secured creditor's duty to maintain collateral
can validate a counterclaim in favor of guarantors.1 9 The holding and
implications in Gartner thus do not seem reconcilable to the Fourth
District rulings that disclaim a duty of lenders to manage loans for
the enhancement of borrowers.
The next Florida appellate decision to analyze negligence liabilities
of a lender to other parties further eroded the insulation from liability
reflected in Rice. In Chotka v. Fidelco Growth Investors,20 the Second
District Court of Appeal ruled that a construction lender could be
liable for construction defects in projects acquired through foreclosure
based on three different theories. Considering claims against a lender
which had completed construction after foreclosure of a condominium
project, the court ruled that liability could be premised upon express
warranties made by the lender when it sold condominium units to the
purchasers. 12 1 Additionally, with respect to portions of the building
completed after the lender acquired the property, liability could be
based upon the same implied warranties applicable to any seller of
condominiums.122 Finally, the lender was held responsible for patent
defects already existing in the project at the time it acquired owner1
ship. 2m
While lenders viewed the decision with alarm, the holdings of
Chotka are not unusual. Rather than disturb existing parameters of
a lender's liability to borrowers, the court ruled only that a lender
acting as a developer absorbs corresponding responsibilities. This
premise seems compatible with the tenets of cases such as Rice which
hold, conversely, that a lender acting only as a lender has proportionately diminished obligations. 12 Even so, by defining new claims against

118. Gartner v. Atlantic Nat'l Bank, 350 So. 2d 495, 497 (lst D.C.A. 1977) (discussing
guarantors' counterclaim as well as their affirmative defenses, court reversed summary judgment
in favor of construction lenders), cert. denied, 367 So. 2d 1122 (Fla. 1979).
119. E.g., Dorsy v. Maryland Natl Bank, 334 So. 2d 273 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1976).
120. 383 So. 2d 1169 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1980).
121. Id. In Chotka, the court reversed dismissal of claims against a construction lender.
Id. at 1170.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. 207 So. 2d 22 (2d D.C.A.), cert. denied, 212 So. 2d 879 (Fla. 1968). See Armetta v.
Clevetrust Realty Investors, 359 So. 2d 540, 543 (4th D.C.A.) (lender acting in 'traditional role
of mortgage lender" has no duty to administer loan for benefit of third parties), cert. denied,
366 So. 2d 879 (Fla. 1978).
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lenders, the decision in Chotka continued the direction toward increasing liability.
The Second District in Kalbes v. California Federal Savings &
Loan Association,12- ruled that a lender having exclusive control of
disbursements on a construction project could be liable to the ownerborrower for failing to assure that payments comply with mechanic's
lien law. Relying upon the fact that provisions in the loan documents
gave the lender complete control over payments from the loan fund,
the court distinguished Rice and allowed a cause of action for negligence because the lender's disregard of lien law created added expense
to the borrower-owner. 26
While the court purported to rule narrowly by emphasizing the
unbridled authority the lender enjoyed over disbursements, the potential reach of Kalbes should cause concern to lenders. The fact that
the construction lender controlled disbursements in that case is not a
limiting feature. Modern loan documents almost always purport to
give a lender the sole prerogative to determine funding since they are
paying for the construction. Moreover, not only does Kalbes impose
duties respecting mechanic's lien compliance that will affect most construction loans, it may expand other facets of lender obligation to
borrowers and even third parties. In construction loans, lenders usually control aspects of development, such as a right to approve subcontractors, scheduling and sometimes even staffing. These controls are
considered prudent from a lending standpoint because the lender's
loan investment in a construction project stands at great risk until its
collateral is a completed and marketable building.m
Under Kalbes, however, contract provisions protecting the lender's
investment until the collateral has materialized may become sources
of liability to the borrower, although the borrower is not an intended
beneficiary of the relevant contract terms. In holding that provisions
intended as the lender's shield may become the borrower's weapon,

125.
126.

497 So. 2d 1256 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1986).
Id.

127. Construction lenders typically fund each step in the construction of a project without
receiving interest from the borrower prior to completion. Because recovering their loan investment depends upon timely and proper completion, various provisions are inserted to ensure the
integrity and efficiency of the construction process.
128. Incomplete construction is rarely an asset salable at other than distress rates. Accordingly, assuring that construction is duly completed is an important and legitimate objective
although sometimes lenders may pursue this goal with excessive zeal. Dunson v. Stockton,
Whatley, Davin & Co., 346 So. 2d 603 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1977) (overly active lender held accountable for obligation of borrower-developer).
,
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the decision in Kalbes represents a departure from cases such as
Armetta v. Clevetrust Realty Investors,m which stated that provisions
inserted soley for the protection of the lender do not create obligations
owing to other parties. 130 By conferring these rights upon the borrower, Kalbes signaled a sharp turnaround in judicial analysis and a
profound future expansion of lender liability.
The Third District Court of Appeals in Assad v. Mendell afforded
some protection to lenders.' 3, In Assad, a homebuyer borrower alleged
that the lender's lawyer owed him a duty to ascertain the soundness
of the house he was buying, since the house constituted collateral
which lender's counsel was presumably obliged to verify. Finding that
the interests of the lender and the homebuyer-borrower were not
aligned and "may very well conflict,"' the court rejected the imposition of lender duty to evaluate and analyze the quality of collateral
for the benefit of homebuyer-borrower. While the court's holding
seems to follow the Fourth District cases of Roose and Armetta which
limit lender liability, its analysis was expressly premised upon cases
defining attorney responsibilities in real estate transactions. It is,
therefore, unclear whether the case shows the Third District's position
on lender liability or is based upon the role and responsibility of an
attorney to persons other than clients. While the ultimate reach of
Assad v. Mendell is difficult to project, it may provide some protection
for lenders and their lawyers.'3
In cases defining lender liability for negligence, a key issue that
has apparently not been reached in Florida is the potential impact of
properly drawn disclaimers of negligence liability. While a party's
M
attempts to disclaim liability for its own negligence are disfavored,'
current law nevertheless accepts such provisions so long as they are
unambiguous. 13 Explicit disclaimers of liability should thus succeed in

129. 359 So. 2d 540 (4th D.C.A.), cert. denied, 366 So. 2d 879 (Fla. 1978).
130. Id. at 543.

131. 511 So. 2d 682 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1987).
132. Id. at 684.
133. Certainly, the holding in Assad rejecting an affirmative duty of lender's counsel to
the borrower runs counter to the dictum in Atlantic Nat'l Bank v. Vest, 480 So. 2d 1328, 1333
(Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1985) which imposed a fiduciary duty on a bank officer because a customer
asked him a legal question.
134. E.g., John's Pass Seafood Co. v. Weber, 369 So. 2d 616 (Fla.2d D.C.A. 1979); Orkin
Exterminating Co. v. Montagano, 359 So. 2d 512 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1978); DeSandalo v. F. &
C. Tractor &Equip. Co., 211 So. 2d 576 (4th D.C.A.), cert. denied, 211 So. 2d 746 (Fla. 1968).
135. FLA. STAT. § 673.606(1) (1987) provides in part that "[tihe holder discharges any party
to the instrument to the extent that without such party's consent the holder ...[uinjustfiably
impairs any collateral for the instrument ... ." Comment 2 to U.C.C. § 3-606 (1978) specifies
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avoiding claims by borrowers or guarantors such as those entertained
in Schaeffer, Gartner, and Kalbes. While this result would undermine
the accountability of lenders for situations they control, until Florida
courts conclude that disclaimers of negligence offend public policy, it
would appear that unambiguous disclaimers could in part stem the
oncoming tide of negligence liability that may otherwise engulf some
lenders. 13
VII.

FIDUCIARY DUTIES

Because the lender and borrower's relationship is inherently adversarial, imposing fiduciary duties upon the lender to protect its prospective adversary's interests seems anomalous. Courts are not even consistent in determining when the fiduciary duty and liability will arise.
Unlike a personal representative or trustee's express acceptance of
such a responsibility, which usually compensates for the accompanying
liability, 13 cases may define lenders as fiduciaries in the absence of
any voluntary assumption of that role.-1
The consequences of remolding the lender from the creditor to the
borrower's guardian are striking. Seemingly appropriate conduct motivated by legitimate self-interest becomes improper self-dealing.
Moreover, as in other tort cases, claims of breaches of fiduciary duty
authorize broader compensatory and punitive damages. 139

that "[c]onsent may be given in advance" and a leading treatise confirms that consent provisions
contained in the loan documents are effective. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 13-15, at 527 (2d ed. 1984).
136. Because both Florida common law doctrine and U.C.C. statutory principles effectuate
disclaimers and consent provisions, loan documentation focusing specifically on alleged new
duties to borrowers may be helpful. To be enforced, however, terms that limit liability must
be explicit. Compare Goyings v. Jack & Ruth Eckerd Found., 403 So. 2d 1144 (Fla. 2d D.C.A.
1981) (weak disclaimer language ineffective, not enforced) with Middleton v. Lomaskin, 266 So.
2d 678, 679 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1972) (court enforced language disclaiming liability for "any and all
claims for loss, damage or injury of any nature whatsoever to person or property ... whether
caused by negligent acts of [defendant] ... or otherwise").
137. See Braswell v. Downs, 11 Fla. 62, 66 (1865) (trustee must accept position before
duties and rights will attach).
138. Barnett Bank v. Hooper, 498 So. 2d 923 (Fla. 1986); Atlantic Nat'l Bank v. Vest, 480
So. 2d 1328 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1985).
139. Cf. Lanman Lithotec, Inc. v. Gurwitz, 478 So. 2d 425 (Fla. 5th D.C.A. 1985) (rejecting
on other grounds punitive damages claim against directors). Rather than operating at arm's
length, any lender during fiduciary duties to its borrower must act in "utmost good faith, fairness
and honesty." Gossett v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 427 So. 2d 386, 387 (Fla. 4th D.C.A.
1983) (citing Reaves v. Hembree, 330 So. 2d 747 (1st D.C.A. 1976)), cert. denied, 345 So. 2d
423 (Fla. 1977).
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These disquieting ramifications struck the banking industry in the
Florida Supreme Court decision of Barnett Bank of West Floridav.
Hooper.40 While demonstrating the adverse consequences of casting
a bank as a fiduciary, the court offered no guidelines for determining
when that casting call will be made. The court in Hooper had imposed
on the bank-fiduciary a duty to disclose to one customer the confidences
of another customer who was perpetrating a fraud. 141 In finding that
a fiduciary relationship existed, however, the court noted merely that
the customer enjoyed a confidential relationship lasting nine years
with the bank and presented no further analysis.'4
The case lacks a sufficient basis for so drastically realigning a
bank's duties in its customer relations. Presumably under Florida law,
every relation between a bank and its customers is confidential M and
certainly a nine year duration is not uncommon. Moreover, whether
a customer contends that it considers the bank to be its fiduciary,
ordinary principles of contract law should require objective circumstances showing an express or implied undertaking by the financial
institution to accept voluntarily such a dangerous role.'14 In Hooper,
although there was no indication that the bank intended to be its
customer's fiduciary, the decision has far-reaching and disconcerting
implications for lenders in Florida.
While the analysis of the fiduciary relationship was more extended
in the district court decision of Atlantic National Bank v. Vest, 145 the
result for financial institutions was no less troubling. In Vest, the
court found a fiduciary duty between a long-time customer and a bank
in the context of a loan transaction. 46 Defining the fiduciary relation

140.
141.

498 So. 2d 923 (Fla. 1986).
Id. at 925.

142. Id.
143. See Milohnich v. First Nat'l Bank, 224 So. 2d 759 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1969).
144.

For example, in B & J Holding Corp. v. Weiss, 353 So. 2d 141 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1977),

the court described the fiduciary liability of a director as being premised upon acceptance of
the office and an implied agreement and undertaking to use the best care and judgment possible
for the corporation and shareholders. Id. at 143. Nothing in Hooper, though, indicates that the
bank chose to accept a fiduciary position unless one would make the formerly implausible argument that by maintaining a customer relationship for years, a financial institution is deemed to
accept such a role. In the aftermath of Hooper, perhaps lenders are on notice that longstanding
customer relations may constitute voluntary acceptance of a fiduciary role. While basing acceptance of a fiduciary role upon such notice creates bad business policy -

a disincentive to

encouraging longtime, warm relations - it is as plausible a premise as any for inferring intent
by a bank to impliedly assume fiduciary duties.
145.
146.

480 So. 2d 1328 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1985).
Id. at 1332-33.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1988

27

Florida Law Review, Vol. 40, Iss. 1 [1988], Art. 3
UNIVERSITY OFFLORIDA LAW REVIEW

(Vol. 40

in "very broad" terms, the court said it applies to "all cases in which
influence has been acquired and abused, and in which confidence has
been reposed and betrayed.

' 147

Reflecting no concern for whether the

alleged fiduciary ever chose to accept such a role, the court held that
the "origin of the confidence is immaterial" and emphasized only the
borrower's election to repose confidence in the bank. 48 In fact, the
borrower in Vest established this type of confidence in the bank and,
therefore, an accompanying fiduciary duty, "by asking the loan officer
,,4
a legal question ....
Application of such fiduciary duties may be even more unsettling
than the supreme court's limited discussion in Hooper. At least in
Hooper, the court's minimal analysis leaves room for contention that
no definition of fiduciary relations was intended and that the court's
reference to only two factors was not all encompassing but merely
highlighted several relevant circumstances. The opinion in Vest, on
the other hand, plainly attempts to define fiduciary relations in a
lending context with wide ranging generalities that apply "Where ever
one man trusts and relies upon another." 15 To rule that such serious
responsibilities can be imposed upon one party by another's unilateral
decision to exude trust defies the most basic principles of contract
and tort law.151

147.

Id. at 1332.

148. Id. Several out-of-state decisions have been far more reluctant to impose fiduciary
duties. A federal appeals court concluded that while imposing a fiduciary duty upon a lender
would not be "beyond the realm of possibility," such a finding would "face serious obstacles"
such as the reality that lender and borrower typically operate "on the opposite side of the
negotiating table." Weinberger v. Kendrick, 698 F.2d 61, 79 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 818 (1983). In Umbaugh Pole Bldg. Co. v. Scott, 58 Ohio St. 2d 282, 390 N.E.2d 320
(1979) the court said that creation of a fiduciary relationship requires that "both parties understand that a special trust or confidence has been reposed." 58 Ohio St. 2d at 286, 390 N.E.2d
at 323.
149. Vest, 480 So. 2d at 1333.
150. Id. at 1332.
151. Not only do contract obligations obviously entail voluntary acceptance of a duty, Prescott v. Mutual Benefit Health & Accident Ass'n, 133 Fla. 510, 516, 183 So. 311, 314 (1938),
even tort duties arise in circumstances of reasonable foreseeability. RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 289 (1977). The holding in Vest also ignores the fundamental conflict in position
between a lender and a borrower. As the Florida Third District Court of Appeal explained:
Citicorp's interests are not aligned with the Assads' interests since the Assads are
a client of Citicorp, and Citicorp intends to make a profit from lending money to
the Assads. Since these two parties' interests may very well conflict, Citicorp's
attorney cannot be expected to protect the interests of his client as well as those
of the Assads'.
Assad v. Mendell, 511 So. 2d 682, 684 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1987).
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Compounding the deficiencies in the generalities espoused in Vest,
the specific conclusion that a customer can unilaterally make a bank
a fiduciary by asking a layman loan officer a legal question is patently
untenable. In many transactions, borrowers may ask lending officers
questions about the legal effect of documents. Not only would transforming such routine inquiry into a fiduciary duty upon an unsuspecting
bank be unfair, only manifest irony commends creating duties based
152
on questions about law that are not even propounded to an attorney.
Perhaps the only consolation for lenders from Vest is the fact that as
a matter of judicial analysis, the court's pronouncements constituted
dictum because the court ultimately found that the bank was not liable
to its customer.'0 Even so, until clarified, that dictum will be quoted
repeatedly by borrowers and other parties seeking to impose fiduciary
duties in marginal circumstances.
Because the supreme court in Hooper may have said too little and
the district court in Vest said too much, financial institutions face
unchanneled prospects that they will owe fiduciary duties to every
long-term customer who claims to trust the bank. While clarification
of these decisions is certainly needed, they present sufficient analysis
to create daunting avenues of exposure for lenders throughout Florida.
VIII.

JOINT VENTURES

Regardless of the duration of any preexisting relationship, a lender
may be held to owe fiduciary duties to its borrower if even a one-time
loan transaction can be characterized as a joint venture. 51 Because
joint venturers, like partners, each owe the other fiduciary obliga-

152. It seems anomalous for the court to reward a bank customer for unilaterally soliciting
legal advice from someone forbidden to give it. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
Rule 5.5(b) (Discussion Draft 1983) (forbidding laymen from practicing law). See also Assad v.
Mendell, 511 So. 2d 682, 684 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1987) (lender's counsel does not owe duty to
disclose construction defects to borrower).
153. The court found that the banks fiduciary duty was satisfied when the loan officer
advised the customer that she did not know the answer to the legal question regarding the title
to an automobile. Vest, 480 So. 2d at 1333.
154. Compare Armetta v. Clevetrust Realty Investors, 359 So. 2d 540, 543 (4th D.C.A.)
(insufficient pleading of joint venture), cert. denied, 366 So. 2d 879 (Fla. 1978) with Florida
Tomato Packers, Inc. v. Wilson, 296 So. 2d 536, 539 (3d D.C.A. 1974) (party furnishing funding
held to be joint venturer), cert. denied, 327 So. 2d 32 (Fla. 1976). See generally Gibson Prod.
Co. v. United States, 637 F.2d 1041, 1047-79 (5th Cir. 1981) (loan transaction actually held to
constitute a joint venture); Connor v. Great W. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 69 Cal. 2d 850, 863, 447
P.2d 609, 615, 73 Cal. Rptr. 369, 375 (1968) (no joint ventures existed when neither party had
an interest in the payments received by the other in a land development agreement).
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tions,' - the borrower in litigation with the lender benefits enormously
if the lender's aggressive efforts to collect an indebtedness can be
characterized as actionable self-dealing. Moreover, because joint venturers are each responsible for the obligations of the joint venture,
such claims also create potential liability to third parties.'
Most loan transactions bear no resemblance to joint ventures.
Under Florida law, a joint venture is a combination of two or more
persons with a common purpose, a joint control or right of control, a
joint proprietary interest in the subject matter, a right to share in
the profits and a duty to share in the losses. 157 While the establishment
of a joint venture relationship requires agreement by the parties, it
can be implied from the circumstances. 15
Almost none of the criteria for a joint venture exists in simple loan
transactions. When all the funds of a loan advanced are to be repaid
at specified interest, and the security requires no further improvement
or action from the lender, the lending cannot be recast as a joint
venture. More complicated lending transactions, however, can present
closer questions, especially if they offer potential returns to the lender
beyond mere interest.
In a substantial construction loan, both lender and borrower share
a common purpose inseeing the project completed successfully since
the property often presents the only realistic avenue for repayment.
Both lender and borrower have a proprietary interest in the subject
matter, one as mortgage holder, the other as owner. Another joint
venture criterion, the right of control, is also met in many instances
because construction loan documents typically create extensive rights
for the lender to control funding, to monitor construction, to obtain

155. See Gossett v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 427 So. 2d 386, 387 (Fla. 4th D.C.A.
1983).
156. See Florida Tomato Packers, Inc. v. Wilson, 296 So. 2d 536, 539 (3d D.C.A. 1974)
(citing Hoover v. Indian River Newspaper, Inc., 165 So. 2d 193 (2d D.C.A. 1964)), cert. denied,
327 So. 2d 32 (Fla. 1976); Soden v. Starkman, 218 So. 2d 763 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1969).
157. See Hewitt v. Price, 222 So. 2d 247, 249 (3d D.C.A.), cert. denied, 225 So. 2d 919
(Fla. 1969).
158. See Navarro v. Espino, 316 So. 2d 646, 648 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1975). Not only is an
express contract unnecessary to show joint venture, out-of-state authority establishes that even
an explicit disclaimer of such a relationship will not prevent a finding that the underlying facts

establish a joint venture. 'The court is not bound by the disclaimer of partnership, joint venture
or agency between the parties. . . 'the transaction must be judged by its real character rather
than by the form and color which the parties have seen fit to give it.' " Rubenstein v. Small,
273 A.D. 102, 104, 75 N.Y.S.2d 483, 485 (N.Y. App. Div. 1947) (quoting Quackenbas v. Sayer,
62 N.Y. 344, 346 (1875)).
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detailed data on the project, and even to approve the selection of
architects or contractors.15 9

In ongoing borrowing relationships with intricate safeguards imposed for the lender's protection, the more difficult obstacles to establishing a joint venture may be proof of sharing in the profits and
losses. If the documents give the lender an equity participation, a
showing can be made that profits are shared. Without an express
right to share in the profits, however, the lender is unlikely to be

deemed a joint venturer although creative borrowers may try to
characterize as profits other economic benefits received by the lender
in addition to an interest yield. 1'0

Even assuming profit-sharing can be established, almost no lending
transaction will expressly obligate the lender to share in losses. Sharing in losses is therefore the most difficult element for the borrower

to establish in joint venture claims. One Florida case, however, found
an implied duty to share in losses in circumstances that can be

analogized to construction loans and other ongoing lending relations.
In Florida Tomato Packers, Inc. v. Wilson,161 the court ruled that
when one party supplies the necessary skill and management, while
the other provides the capital, both are deemed to share in losses

159. However, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin has explained that provisions authorizing
careful monitoring of collateral do not necessarily establish a joint venture:
Nor is it unusual for individuals or lending institutions to closely follow the business
of a borrower especially where the credit is extended on open account. Where the
borrowings are continuous, such close contact is an effective method by which the
lender informs himself of the desirability of continuing the account and protects
his loans ... . T]he close business contact between [lender] and [borrower] did
not necessarily involve a voice in the business by the [lender] or give him a right
of joint control.
In re Estate of Starer, 20 Wis. 2d 268, 273-74, 121 N.W.2d 872, 875-76 (1963).
160. Although not characterized as interest or profits, courts have the authority to examine
sums or benefits received by the lender in light of their true character. First Am. Bank &
Trust v. Windjammer Time Sharing Resort, Inc., 483 So. 2d 732, 736 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1986);
Financial Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Burleigh House, Inc., 305 So. 2d 59 (3d D.C.A. 1974),
cert. discharged, 336 So. 2d 1145 (Fla. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1042 (1977). Thus, a
construction lender which agrees not only to fund a residential project at a stated interest rate,
but also to provide financing afterwards to unit buyers and thus receive further loan fees, may
increase the likelihood that profit sharing would be found. See Burleigh House, Inc., 305 So.
2d at 60.
161. 296 So. 2d 536 (3d D.C.A. 1974), cert. denied, 327 So. 2d 32 (Fla. 1976). Florida law
is clear that establishing a joint venture '"means to be responsible or liable for the losses created
by the venture and liability, if any, to creditors or third parties." Phillips v. United States
Fidelity & Guar. Co., 155 So. 2d 415, 419 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1963); accord, Gossett v. St. Paul
Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 427 So. 2d 386, 387 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1983).
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because any return depends upon the success of the enterprise.6
While the decision did not involve a financial institution, the analysis
is applicable to many situations where borrower entrepreneurs contribute skll and management to projects substantially or exclusively
funded by lenders.
Notwithstanding the possibilities for joint venture created by
Florida Tomato Packers and reflected in some out-of-state decisions,
so far no Florida case has held a transaction structured as a loan to
constitute a joint venture subject to the attendant responsibilities. In
First Wisconsin National Bank v. Roose,'63 a borrower attempted
unsuccessfully to base a joint venture claim upon little more than the
existence of an agreement for financing. Finding an absence of any
allegations to substantiate criteria such as sharing in profits and losses,
the court affirmed dismissal of the joint venture count.'" One year
later, the Florida Fourth District Court of Appeal repeated that
analysis in rejecting a similarly deficient claim in Armetta v. Clevetrust
Realty Investors.16
While Florida law does not preclude defining certain unconventional
lending transactions as joint ventures, to date no serious joint venture
claims against financial institutions have received appellate treatment.
While several palpably deficient claims have been summarily discarded, current case law leaves intact the prospect that a proper
pleading of appropriate facts can sustain a joint venture claim, along
with the significant consequences that would result.
IX.

ABILITY FOR LENDER CONTROL OF THE BORROWER

Although related to joint venture theory, claims based on lender
control over the borrower and its operation rely on different factual
underpinnings. As with joint venture claims, "control" cases can create
lender liability
not only to the borrower but also to third parties with
|

162. See Florida Tomato Packers, Inc. v. Wilson, 296 So. 2d 536, 539 (3d D.C.A. 1974),
cert. denied, 327 So. 2d 32 (Fla. 1976). See also Hyman v. Regenstein, 258 F.2d 502, 513 (5th
Cir. 1958) (applying Florida law, the court said an agreement to furnish finances does not
necessarily create a joint venture even though profits may be divided), cert. denied, 359 U.S.
913 (1959). But see Ambrecht Lumber Co. v. Adair, 91 Fla. 460, 479, 108 So. 222, 227-28 (1926)
(repayment of loan from net profit does not necessarily create partnership).
163. 348 So. 2d 610 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1977).
164. Id. at 611.
165. 359 So. 2d 540 (4th D.C.A.), cert. denied, 366 So. 2d 879 (Fla. 1978), aff d, 384 So.
2d 55 (4th D.C.A. 1980). In an earlier decision, the Supreme Court of Florida held that a loan
does not constitute a joint venture "except in the broad, non legal sense in which any agreement
for a loan can be considered a joint enterprise." Griffin v. Kelly, 92 So. 2d 515, 517-18 (Fla. 1957).
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claims against the borrower.' Both theories entail lender interrelation
with its borrower that goes beyond ordinary credit transactions. The
distinction between the claims turns on control. While joint venture
theory includes as one of its elements a right of at least mutual control
over the transaction, cases based exclusively upon allegations of "control" require a showing of so much domination by the lender that the
borrower is deemed its alter ego. 1'
In the leading Florida case on control theory, the First District
Court of Appeal found in Dunson v. Stockton, Whatley, Davin &
Co. 168the lender was liable for obligations of its borrower. In Dunson,
the court held the lender foreclosing upon a residence accountable for
the homebuyers' claims against the borrower-developer because the
lender strayed far from its role as "a mere mortgagee. 1169 In fact, the

circumstances of Dunson reflect nearly complete lender dominance.
While the house was under construction, the lender required that all
checks drawn by the borrower-developer be countersigned by its employee. The lender later placed on its own payroll the president of
the borrower-developer. At one point, the lender even told the homebuyers that it was taking over construction of the house. Based upon
these facts, the Second District held that the California decision in
Connor v. Great Western Savings & Loan Association,7" supported
holding the lender accountable for obligations of the borrower-de171
veloper to the homebuyers

Although the result in Dunson seems justified in light of its striking
facts, reliance upon an ill-defined "control" theory seems unnecessary.
The absence of any particularized theory for liability leaves lenders

166. Dunson v. Stockton, Whatley, Davin & Co., 346 So. 2d 603, 608 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1977)
(citing Connor v. Great W. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 69 Cal. 2d 850, 447 P.2d 609, 73 Cal. Rptr. 369
(1968)).

167. Id. at 606 ("ft]he separate identities... were extinguished and the identities merged
into one'). See Lundgren, Liability of a Creditorin a Control Relationship With Its Debtor,
67 MARQ. L. REV. 523 (1984) (creditors who exercise substantial influence risk potential liability

for debtor's debts).
168. 346 So. 2d 603 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1977).
169. Dunson, 346 So. 2d at 608. See also Armetta v. Clevetrust Realty Investors, 359 So.
2d 540, 543 (4th D.C.A. 1978) (citing Dunson, 346 So. 2d 603 (1st D.C.A. 1977)), cert. denied,
366 So. 2d 879 (Fla. 1978), affd, 384 So. 2d 55 (4th D.C.A. 1980).
170. 69 Cal. 2d 850, 447 P.2d 609, 73 Cal. Rptr. 369 (1968). In Connor, the Supreme Court
of California held liable a savings and loan association to the purchaser of a home suffering

construction defects. While rejecting joint venture theory, the court premised liability upon the
lender's direct control of the actions of the borrower-builder.
171.

Dunson, 346 So. 2d at 608.
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exposed to claims from any borrower who can allege similar facts.
For example, the First District citing Dunson without elaboration
allowed a claim based upon conclusory allegations that the lender
"'took over' the project." 172
Rather than leave vacant the framework for analyzing control
claims, several options are available to Florida courts. The Restatement of Agency includes a provision delineating when one party's
domination of another makes it the principal liable for the obligations
incurred by the dominated party as its agent. 173 Although rarely cited,
this section includes criteria for measuring excessive control, and was
relied upon by the Supreme Court of Minnesota in imposing liability
on a lender for its borrower's obligations. 74
Other methodologies for circumscribing control claims are available
under Florida law. Because the court in Dunson found that the lender
and borrower were alter egos, Florida's corporate law governing alter
egos and corporate veils could apply. 71iSince creating alter ego liability
in other industries depends upon an already developed corporate law
analysis, it may be appropriate to apply the same criteria to lender
claims. A different result would have been reached in Dunson had
ordinary principles of corporate law prevailed because elements of
alter ego could probably have not been satisfied. In Dunson there
was no evidence that corporate formalities were ignored by the lender

172. Schaeffer v. Gilmer, 353 So. 2d 847, 853 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1977) (counterclaim allowed
despite its incorporation of substantial "heifer dust").
173.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 140, comment a (1958). In the Restatement,

the rule is explained as follows:
A security holder who merely exercises a veto power over the business acts of his
debtor by preventing purchases or sales above specified amounts does not thereby
become a principal. However, if he takes over the management of the debtor's
business either in person or through an agent, and directs what contracts may or
may not be made, he becomes a principal, liable as any principal for the obligations
incurred thereafter in the normal course of business by the debtor who has now
become his general agent. The point at which the creditor becomes a principal is
that at which he assumes de facto control over the conduct of his debtor, whatever
the terms of the formal contract with his debtor may be.
Id.
174. See A. Gay Jensen Farms Co. v. Cargill, Inc., 309 N.W.2d 285, 291 (Minn. 1981). In
Cargill, various creditors of a grain elevator operator successfully sued its sole creditor based
on extreme facts showing ongoing and active control by the creditor of its debtor.
175. See Advertects, Inc. v. Sawyer Indus., Inc., 84 So. 2d 21, 24 (Fla. 1955) (must show
corporation alter ego of stockholders to hold stockholders individually liable); see also Valdes
v. Leisure Resource Group, Inc., 810 F.2d 1345 (5th Cir. 1987) (court applied ordinary corporate
law principles to reject an alter ego claim).
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or the borrower-developer, nor was there any suggestion that their
association had any fraudulent purpose. 176
In addition to creating difficult burdens of proof, conventional corporate analysis of alter ego relations creates results beyond those
sought in Dunson. Under general corporate analysis, piercing the
corporate veil and proving alter ego relationships leave the parties
exposed to every liability of the other 7 In Dunson, the court did
not contemplate wholesale destruction of separate identities, or unlimited lender exposure for all creditors of the borrower-developer. The
court's focus was upon whether the interrelation of lender and borrower in a particular transaction justified imposing liabilities related
specifically to that transaction."78
Assuming conventional corporate alter ego theory would demand
too much in proof and go too far in results, a simpler framework exists
to measure when a lender's control should make it accountable for the
borrower's liabilities under ordinary principles of respondeat
superior.179 Since the lender in Dunson was actually paying a salary
to the president of the borrower-developer and exercising day-to-day
control over his activities, master-servant law would presumably have
established liability without resort to poorly defined or exotic
analysis.180
Master-servant principles might usefully govern other so-called
control cases. Indeed, just as lender liability concerns center around
the extent of dominance exerted, master-servant analysis similarly

176. Dunson, 346 So. 2d at 603. In Dunson, rather than attack based upon corporate status,
the claimants prevailed upon a practical showing of the control by the lender over its borrower.
177. See Valdes v. Leisure Resource Group, Inc., 810 F.2d 1345 (5th Cir. 1987); Lundgren,
supra note 167, at 523.
178. Dunsan, 346 So. 2d at 605-08. In Dunson, the court held that the lender was subject
to a claim by the home buyer against the borrower-developer arising from a dwelling financed
under the complained of control conditions. Id.
179. See McCabe v. Howard, 281 So. 2d 362 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1973) (as with other agreements,
an agreement to act as an agent or servant can be established by implication and based on even
circumstantial evidence).
180. Id. See A. Gay Jenson Farms Co. v. Cargill, Inc., 309 N.W.2d 285, 291 (Minn. 1981)
(citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 140, comment a (1958)). As another court
expressed the analysis, for a lender to be held liable as principal for its obligor's debts, control
must reflect "such domination of finances, policies and practices that the controlled corporation
has, so to speak, no separate mind, will or existence of its own and is but a business conduit
for its principal." Krivo Indus. Supply Co. v. National Drillers & Chem. Corp., 483 F.2d 1098,
1106 (5th Cir. 1973) (quoting 1 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAw OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 43 (perm. ed. rev. 1963)), modified, 490 F.2d 916 (5th Cir. 1974).
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distinguishes servants and agents from independent contractors based
upon the exercise of control.""l
If the master has the right to control performance of the work,
liability may lie even for the torts of an independent contractor.1 2 If
one accepts the borrower as a fully independent party, when its performance is actually directed by the lender, notions of fairness and
existing master-servant law might support the imposition of liability.
Whether assessed under the Restatements, corporate alter ego
theory or principles of respondeat superior, further definition of claims
based on "control" theory is needed. Without refinement of analysis,
lenders will have no ability to predict when their efforts to salvage a
problem loan, or assist a struggling borrower through more intensive
supervision may backfire and create liabilities that could include even
the borrower's debts to others. The fundamental premise of Dunson,
that a lender should be accountable for what it causes to happen
through a borrower it controls, seems sound. What is needed is a
clarifying framework to determine the point at which such costly accountability should be imposed.
X.

LENDER LIABILITY AND THE

DuTY

OF

GOOD FAITH

Even in the absence of fiduciary responsibilities or vicarious liability
arising from excessive control, borrowers are arguing that a lender
is subject to a duty of good faith toward them that can be an independent source of liability.1 The potential sources of such a duty are at
least fourfold. They include sections 671.203 and 671.208, the good
faith provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.), 84 Florida
181. In analyzing the character of control that will attach vicarious liability to the master,
Florida courts distinguish between control over the final result obtained and direction over the
means employed. Gulf Ref. Co. v. Vrilkinson, 94 Fla. 664, 114 So. 503 (1927); Farmers &
Merchants Bank v. Vocelle, 106 So. 2d 92 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1958).
182. Burch v. Strange, 126 So. 2d 898 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1961). See Pears v. Florida Publishing Co., 132 So. 2d 561 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1961) (employer control over performance invokes a
master servant relationship over the independent contractor so as to impose liability upon the
employer).
183. See Flagship Natl Bank v. Gray Distrib. Sys., Inc., 485 So. 2d 1336, 1340 (Fla. 3d
D.C.A. 1986) (borrower raised, but court rejected, argument that FLA. STAT. § 671.208 (1971)
good faith obligation may override express contract terms); see also K.M.C. Co. v. Irving Trust
Co., 757 F.2d 752 (6th Cir. 1985) (allowing claim based on breach of duty of good faith); Brown
v. Avemco Inv. Corp., 603 F.2d 1367 (9th Cir. 1979) (court reversed judgment against lender
and remanded to examine if good faith dealings); Alaska State Bank v. Fairco, 674 P.2d 288
(Alaska 1983) (bank acted in bad faith by failing to give notice before repossession of collateral);
First Nat'l Bank v. Twombley, 689 P.2d 1226 (Mont. 1984) (bank's bad faith could justify award
of punitive damages).
184. FLA. STAT. § 671.203 (1987) (good faith obligation); id. § 671.208 (acceleration option).
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cases imposing a duty of good faith upon insurers and creating a right
of action for violation of that duty, 18 general case law in Florida
providing that contractual provisions are to be interpreted in light of
an implied duty of good faith,'6 and out-of-state authorities holding
lenders liable for breaching a duty of good faith.'8
Notwithstanding these potential grounds for imposing a duty of
good faith upon lenders, the leading Florida case discarded the contention that any such duty overrides the lender's right to pursue its
remedies under ordinary principles of contract law. In the 1986 decision
of FlagshipNational Bank v. Gray DistributionSystems, Inc.,' ss the
Third District Court of Appeal rejected the claim that a lender violated
a duty of good faith when it refused to extend further funding to a
borrower, and asserted default and instituted court proceedings.
While acknowledging the good faith provisions of the U.C.C., the
court held that they could not be applied to override express terms
of the lending contract.1 9 Because the note enforced by the lender
was a demand instrument, the court found that the U.C.C. provisions
did not limit the lender's prerogative to call the loan obligation "at
any time with or without reason."' 190 In so holding, the district court
overruled factual findings by the trial judge that relied upon months
of interaction between lender and borrower.191 Expressly rejecting the
arguments that U.C.C. provisions and out-of-state authority compelled
a different result,1 2 the court did not address arguments based upon
general Florida case law that assume good faith in applying contracts,
nor did the court consider any analogy based upon insurance cases.

185. See, e.g., Smith v. Guaranty Ins. Co., 435 So. 2d 848 (2d D.C.A.), cert. denied, 441
So. 2d 633 (Fla. 1983).
186. Cf. Fernandez v. Vazquez, 397 So. 2d 1171 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1981) ("established contract
principle that a party's good faith cooperation is an implied condition precedent to performance
of a contract").
187. See supra note 180 and accompanying text.
188. 485 So. 2d 1336 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1986).
189. Id. at 1340. In so holding, the court ruled that another aid to contract construction,
course of dealing, was similarly ineffective to overcome the express and unambiguous agreement
of the parties. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 671.205(4) (1985)).
190. Id.
191. Id. at 1339.40. The trial judge had found that the lender's extension of credit for four
months beyond the loan limit constituted a course of dealing which restructured the original
non-binding line of credit arrangement into an obligation to continue funding. Id.
192. Id. at 1341. In addition to considering the code sections referenced in note 184, supra,
the court discussed but declined to follow K.M.C. Co. v. Irving Trust Co., 757 F.2d 752 (6th
Cir. 1985), which had applied a duty of good faith in circumstances of "some similarity." Id.
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In view of the focus upon express terms of the loan documents, it
seems unlikely other arguments would have changed the result in
Flagship.
The rejection of the borrower's good faith claim in Flagship National Bank established that such contentions will have limited impact,
unless subsequent case law signals a different direction. Certainly,
the Flagship National Bank decision did not deny that good faith is
a criterion for construing contract obligations. 193 By vindicating the
primary role of written provisions, however, the court sharply confined
the role of good faith in lender liability litigation. Under Flagship
National Bank, good faith constitutes an interpretive tool for ambiguous provisions rather than an independent predicate for duty and
liability. Thus, whatever may be the prospect that a later Florida
court might create a right of action by analogizing financial institutions
that insure to financial institutions that lend, the present law of Florida
is not following that of several other states in creating an independent
right of action based on a lender's duty of good faith.
XI.

CONCLUSION

Despite holdings such as Flagship National Bank, the current
momentum of case law in Florida is plainly toward expanding lender
liability. While part of this movement may be due to out-of-state
influences, much of the expansion of responsibility arises from the
state's own propensity to develop principles to ensure that wrongs
will have a remedy. Although the courts adhere philosophically to the
sanctity of written contracts, they seem to allow oral representations
to vitiate the parol evidence rule so long as a claim is shrewdly tailored
to meet an exception.
As a result, lenders will have less success in securing a summary
disposition of hard fought lender liability cases. They will be obliged
either to settle with their borrowers or face an increasingly varied
and dangerous assortment of counterclaims. While this article has
discussed the principal claims that prevail in Florida, other theories
abound ranging from conspiracy allegations T9 and prime rate claims,195

193. Id. at 1340. While recognizing the applicability of good faith, the court found it subordinated to the express terms of the contract. Additionally, the court held that FLA. STAT. §
671.208 (1985) does not reach demand instruments. Id.
194. Country Park Estate, Inc. v. Balantzow, 183 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1966) (borrower
obtained reversal of an adverse summary judgment based on allegations of a conspiracy between
the lender and a former officer of the borrower). See Kilgore Ace Hardware, Inc. v. Newsome,
352 So. 2d 918, 920 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1977) (a so-called civil conspiracy claim requires a showing
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to RICO, 196 conversion,197 civil theft, 198 equitable subordination, and

other statutory predicates for liability that are rapidly evolving.2°°

that the concerted action complained of constituted a separate tort such as interference with a
business relationship or inducement of a breach of fiduciary duty). Cf. Banks Real Estate Corp.
v. Gordon, 353 So. 2d 859, 860-61 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1977) (claim rejected on its merits).
195. The premise of so-called prime rate cases is that the lender is defrauding the borrower
by representing that the interest charged will be pegged to the lender's own prime rate. In
some instances, while the borrower was paying interest under the belief that prime rate was
the lender's best rate, the lender was actually lending to others below his own so-called prime
rate. Since the so-called prime rate being used to establish the borrower's interest is higher
than the lender's best rate, the borrower may allege fraud. A number of prime rate cases are
molded as claims of fraud and even racketeering activity so that the remedies of the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) can be invoked against the lender. See Haroco,
Inc. v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 747 F.2d 384 (7th Cir. 1984), affd, 473 U.S. 606
(1985). As a practical matter, so-called prime rate litigation is losing importance because lenders
have revised their loan documents to eliminate or clarify the words "prime rate" to avoid the
impression that it constitutes the best rate given a lender's best customer.
196. Claims under RICO can be brought federally, 18 U.S.C. § 1961 et seq. (1982) as well as
through the Florida counterpart to that statute found in FLA. STAT. § 895.01 et seq. (1987). In
general, Florida courts apply federal case law under RICO due to Florida's explicit adoption of
federal provisions. See Moorehead v. State, 383 So. 2d 629 (Fla. 1980); see also Banderas v.
Banco Cent. del Ecuador, 461 So. 2d 265, 269 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1985).
Under federal or Florida RICO, treble damages and other remedies may be available to the
claimant whose allegations meet somewhat intricate pleading and proof requirements that include
proof of a pattern of racketeering activity. The activity does not require a nexus to organized
crime. Banderas,461 So. 2d at 269-70. Because fraud that is "well organized, on-going, systematic" can give rise to RICO claims against or even by a financial institution, it is available as a
tool in lending cases where at least two incidents of fraudulent racketeering activity have
occurred. Id. Cf. Beatty v. Florida, 418 So. 2d 271, 272 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1982) (criminal case).
Compare Haroco, Inc. v. American Natl Bank & Trust Co., 747 F.2d 384 (7th Cir. 1984), affd,
473 U.S. 606 (1985) (borrower sued bank for RICO violations claiming fraudulent misrepresentations as to prime rate) with Rae v. Union Bank, 725 F.2d 478 (9th Cir. 1984) (RICO claim
rejected due to absence of allegations of a separate criminal enterprise apart from the bank).
197. Lenders who proceed to recover collateral prior to a valid default sometimes face
claims for conversion of the borrower's property. Moreover, conversion claims may stand upon
a financial institution's failure to pay accrued interest on an escrow account or wrongful withdrawal of money from a bank account. Aero Int'l Corp. v. Florida Nat'l Bank, 437 So. 2d 156
(Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1983). A lender's potential liability for conversion for failing to disburse funds
could turn on whether the undisbursed funds are segregated or specifically designated for a
loan and, if so, whether the refusal to fund was wrongful. See Siegel Trading Co. v. Coral
Ridge Nat'l Bank, 328 So. 2d 476 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1976); FLA. STAT. § 673.419 (1987) (creating
cause of action for conversion against bank that pays check upon a forged endorsement). Compare
Senfeld v. Bank of Nova Scotia Trust Co., 450 So. 2d 1157, 1160-61 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1984)
(specific funds); Allen v. Gordon, 429 So. 2d 369 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1983) (money taken from bank
account can be subject to conversion actions when amounts and accounts are ascertainable) with
Rosen v. Marlin, 486 So. 2d 623, 625 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1986) ('"mere obligation to pay money
may not be enforced by a conversion action") (quoting Belford Trucking Co. v. Zagar, 243 So.
2d 646 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1971)).
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In confronting the seemingly unlimited tide of claims against lenders, the starting point for analysis should be that there is nothing
analytically unsound in making lenders subject to the same liabilities
as other functionaries in commerce. While financial institutions obvi-

ously serve important policy considerations, so do insurers, contractors, and all the other enterprises subject to spiraling liability in
today's environment.

It is equally sound to attach liability to secured parties who exceed
the role of the traditional lender. After all, to the extent a party
voluntarily assumes particular roles, accompanying responsibilities and

198. A close companion to the conversion claim is civil theft. FLA. STAT. § 812.035(7)
(1987). While the conduct constituting civil theft parallels conversion, Senfeld v. Bank of Nova
Scotia Trust Co., 450 So. 2d 1157, 1165 n.12 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1984), the assorted remedies
including attorneys fees and treble or punitive damages, require a showing of criminal intent.
Rosen v. Marlin, 486 So. 2d 623, 624 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1986) (theft claim inapplicable to contractual
dispute). See St. John v. Kuper, 489 So. 2d 833 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1986) (in a lending transaction,
failure to repay will not constitute civil theft); see also Rosen, 486 So. 2d at 623; American Int'l
Realty, Inc. v. Southeast First Nat'l Bank, 468 So. 2d 383, 384 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1985).
199. In bankruptcy, a lender that acts inequitably or becomes overly involved in internal
borrower affairs could lose the priority of its mortgage under principles of equitable subordination. See In re Am. Lumber Co., 5 Bankr. 470 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1980). See generally DeNatale
& Abram, The Doctrine of Equitable Subordinationas Applied to Nonmanagement Creditors,
40 Bus. LAW. 417 (1985).
200. Some claims have been advanced under federal securities laws contending that a lender's active supervision of the borrower creates secondary liability as a control person respecting
the borrower's violation of the securities law. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 20(a), 15
U.S.C. § 78t (1982); Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77o (1982). Thus, in Miller v. Woodmoor
Corp., [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 96,109 (D. Colo. Apr. 27, 1976),
the court held that a claim was stated against a lender in control of a land development scheme
in which securities law violations supposedly occurred. See Technology Exch. Corp. of Am.,
Inc. v. Grant County State Bank, 646 F. Supp. 179 (D. Colo. 1986) (construction lender's intense
regulation of borrower provides basis for claim due to borrower's Rule 10b-5 violations). Even
without control, a lender could be a potential target in a claim based on aiding and abetting
securities law violations by the borrower. Monsen v. Consolidated Dressed Beef Co., 579 F.2d
793 (3d Cir.) (creditor bank potentially liable as aider and abetter due to knowledge of customer's
securities fraud), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 930 (1978). Compare Little v. Valley Nat'l Bank, 650
F.2d 218 (9th Cir. 1981) (bank liable where it proceeded in reckless disregard of borrower's
violations of securities law) with Woodward v. Metro Bank of Dallas, 522 F.2d 84 (5th Cir.
1975) (mere lending relationship did not impose aider and abetter liability).
Additionally, lenders may have liability for their borrower's unpaid withholding taxes if they
advance funds knowing that the taxes will not be paid. 26 U.S.C. §§ 3505 & 6672 (1982); cf.
United States v. McMullen, 516 F.2d 917 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 915 (1975). Exposure
to lenders could also exist under the Comprehensive Environmental Compensation and Liability
Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (1982) et seq. for cleaning up hazardous waste and materials on
property. Compare United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573 (D. Md.
1986) (lender acquiring property through foreclosure liable for clean up costs accruing previously)
with In re T.P. Long Chem., Inc., 45 Bankr. 278 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985) (secured party not
liable for clean up costs because it does not constitute an "owner or operator").
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litigation exposure properly follow. Serious questions, however, can
be raised about two facets of duty under Florida lender law. First,
cases such as Kalbes v. CaliforniaFederal Savings & Loan Association appear to impose lender liabilities based on provisions intended
to create lender protection. This approach is wrong as a matter of
contract analysis because it defeats the intentions of the parties and
rewrites their contractual undertaldng. From a policy standpoint, such
an expansion of duty seems inappropriate because it injects uncertainty
into lending transactions while providing potential windfalls to borrowers by giving them rights of action that were not contemplated. On
the other hand, while settled contractual principles should govern the
relation of lender and borrower, liabilities to third parties have been
properly anchored upon general tort principles in accordance with
holdings such as Chotka v. Fidelco Growth Investors.
In addition to the imprecise alignment of duties, Florida courts
can also be questioned for their unchanneled extensions of fiduciary
obligation. While rare cases may justify constituting a lender or bank
as the protector of the customer having opposing interests, in general,
lending does not appear to be an appropriate context for such duties.
At a minimum, objective circumstances showing a voluntary assumption of such duties, whether express or implied, should be established
before financial institutions become open targets for every customer
who professes to repose confidence in the bank.
Although some questionable decisions that steer lender responsibility into uncharted waters, the overall direction of this area of law
reflects more the results of aggressive and creative litigation by borrowers than it evinces fundamentally new legal tenets in lending law.
While legislation could be enacted to harbor lenders from some of the
more unjustifiable liabilities, 2° 1the more promising course lies in clarification of certain decisions so that the delineation of lender duty is
consistent with the underlying judicial philosophies and policies.
201. In the 1987 session, the Florida Legislature enacted an amendment to FLA. STAT. §
702.01 to be effective on Oct. 1, 1987, providing that mortgage foreclosures shall be tried solely
by a judge and that any counterclaims are to be severed for separate trial. Especially because
mortgage foreclosures are the predicate for many of the most substantial counterclaims, denial
of jury trial in this setting would have obvious and major implications for lender litigation. This
legislation, however, appears to be an encroachment upon the procedural prerogative reserved
for Florida's judiciary and therefore may violate FLA. CONST. art. V § 2(a). See Bamber v.

State, 300 So. 2d 269 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1974) (statute infringing upon judicial discretion to grant
bail held unconstitutional). Additional constitutional challenges to the new statute could rely on
the right to trial by jury in actions at law. U.S. CONsT. amend. VII, FLA. CONST. art. I, §

22. Because existing Florida law affords the right to a jury trial to borrowers who raise legal
defenses in a foreclosure proceeding, the new statute may contravene this present entitlement
and thus violate the United States and Florida Constitutions. See Spring v. Ronel Ref., Inc.,
421 So. 2d 46 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1982).
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